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Daniel F. Spulber*
ABSTRACT
Major technological changes driving the Fourth Industrial
Revolution combine complementary inventions to form complex
innovations. These include the Internet of Things (IoT), 5G mobile communications, artificial intelligence (AI), cloud computing, data analytics, autonomous vehicles, additive manufacturing, and augmented/virtual reality. This article shows that
negotiation of patent license contracts fully eliminates many influential antitrust concerns about complementary inventions, including “royalty stacking,” “SEP hold-up,” “patent thickets,”
“blocking patents,” the “Tragedy of the Anti-Commons,” and “regulatory patent pools.” Negotiation of patent license contracts implies that total royalties will be less than those charged by a bundling monopoly. Negotiation of patent license contracts in a
competitive market avoids distortions from royalties per unit of
output and eliminates the multiple-marginalization problem. Negotiation generates contract provisions consistent with contingent
royalty arrangements. Negotiation also has important implications for antitrust policy toward patent pools. The analysis shows
that patent pools serve to mitigate transaction costs rather than
to regulate total royalties. This article suggests that antitrust policy makers should continue to be neutral between negotiation of
patent license contracts and patent pools. This article supports
the view that negotiation is pro-competitive as expressed by the
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Technological change increasingly depends on complex innovations that combine many complementary inventions.1 Technological advances based on complex innovations include the Internet of Things (IoT), 5G mobile communications, artificial
intelligence (AI), cloud computing, data analytics, autonomous
vehicles, additive manufacturing, and augmented/virtual reality.2 These significant technological advances have been described as the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR).3 This article
considers antitrust policy toward patent licensing when there
are complementary inventions and shows why negotiation of patent license agreements is fundamental for formulating antitrust policy.
The growing importance of complementary inventions and
complex innovations has raised a number of antitrust concerns.4
Various policy makers question whether patent licensing in a
competitive market achieves economic efficiency.5 Some express

1. See Herbert A. Simon, The Architecture of Complexity, 106 PROC. AM.
PHIL. SOC’Y. 467, 468 (1962) (“Roughly, by a complex system I mean one made
up of a large number of parts that interact in a nonsimple way. In such systems,
the whole is more than the sum of the parts, not in an ultimate, metaphysical
sense, but in the important pragmatic sense that, given the properties of the
parts and the laws of their interaction, it is not a trivial matter to infer the
properties of the whole.”).
2. See generally EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, PATENTS AND THE FOURTH
INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION: THE INVENTIONS BEHIND DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION
(2017) (providing a broad discussion on these and related topics).
3. Klaus Schwab, The Fourth Industrial Revolution: What It Means and
How to Respond, FOREIGN AFF. (Dec. 12, 2015), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2015-12-12/fourth-industrial-revolution; KLAUS SCHWAB,
THE FOURTH INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 1, 7 (2017).
4. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 7 (2017),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1049793/ip_guidelines_2017.pdf [hereinafter ANTITRUST GUIDELINES]
(“While intellectual property licensing arrangements are typically welfare-enhancing and procompetitive, antitrust concerns may nonetheless arise.”).
5. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING
PATENT NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 5, 22 (2011),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/evolving-ip-marketplace-aligning-patent-notice-and-remedies-competition-report-federaltrade/110307patentreport.pdf (discussing the effects on competition of patent
notice and remedies); see also Richard A. Epstein, F. Scott Kieff & Daniel F.
Spulber, The FTC, IP, and SSOs: Government Hold-Up Replacing Private Coordination, 8 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 1, 5–6 (2012) (discussing policy concerns about patent license markets).
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concerns that complementary inventions could increase total patent license royalties and discourage innovation, often without
empirical support.6 Policy discussions also raise the issue of increased costs of coordination between patent holders and technology implementers.7 Some policy analysts and researchers ask
whether market institutions such as standards organizations
are pro-competitive.8 This article addresses these antitrust concerns and shows that market negotiation of patent licenses promotes competition and protects consumer welfare.
Practically all patent license agreements form through market negotiation, with the exception of licenses offered by patent
pools. The present discussion develops a framework that examines market negotiation of patent license contracts with complementary inventions. The analysis shows that market negotiation
between patent holders and technology implementers achieves
economic efficiency with complementary inventions. The present
study finds that market negotiation between technology providers and technology implementers promotes innovation and is
pro-competitive.
The main insight is that negotiation in a competitive market
generates total royalties that are strictly less than those of a
bundled monopoly patent holder. Negotiation between patent
holders and technology implementers avoids distortionary royalties from running royalties that are constant per unit of output
and solves the multiple-marginalization problem. Royalties are
contingent on prices in the product market, which accords with
most observed royalty arrangements such as shares of sales

6. See Kirti Gupta, The Patent Policy Debate in the High-Tech World, 9 J.
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 827, 857 (2013) (“The empirical basis for some of the
specific concerns raised, however, is decidedly mixed.”).
7. See id. at 844–45 (noting that technology implementers need to reach
“multiple independent licensing negotiations,” which results in increased costs
and lower margins); see also Michael Abramowicz, The Danger of Underdeveloped Patent Prospects, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1065, 1068 (2007) (discussing ways
that patent holders lack sufficient incentives to fully utilize their IP); Ted
Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341 (2009) (same).
8. Damien Geradin & Miguel Rato, Can Standard-Setting Lead to Exploitative Abuse? A Dissonant View on Patent Hold-Up, Royalty Stacking and the
Meaning of FRAND, 3 EUR. COMPETITION J. 101, 128–29 (2007) (“[W]hile the
theoretical literature is fairly rich, the empirical literature testing the validity
of the royalty stacking and anti-commons theories in the real world is sparse
and often not very rigorous.”); see also Jay P. Choi, Standardization and Experimentation: Ex Ante vs. Ex Post Standardization, 12 EUR. J. POL. ECON. 273
(1996) (analyzing when standardization yields optimal results).
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revenues, lump-sum fees based on prices, profit shares, equity
shares, options, milestones, cross-licensing, alliances, joint-venture agreements, and bundling of goods and services with intellectual property (IP). With competition, both the upstream market for patent license contracts and the downstream product
market will be efficient. This, in turn, provides incentives for efficiency in invention, innovation, and standardization.
These conclusions have useful implications for antitrust policy toward patent licensing. The present analysis supports the
joint position of the United States Department of Justice (DOJ),
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), and National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) regarding
the importance of negotiation for efficiency and patent licensing.9 This joint Policy Statement points out that negotiation promotes efficiency for patent licensing generally and for licensing
standard essential patents (SEPs) subject to Fair, Reasonable,
and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) Commitments.10 The present
analysis also supports a key principle set forth by the DOJ Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Antitrust Guidelines: “intellectual property licensing allows firms to
combine complementary factors of production and is generally
procompetitive.”11
Patent licensing with complementary inventions has raised
four types of antitrust policy concerns that this article argues
are misguided. These antitrust issues are as follows: (1) patent
holders generate “royalty stacking” by choosing royalties that exceed what a bundling monopoly patent holder would charge; (2)
patent holders engage in “SEP hold-up” by raising royalties to
9. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, & Nat’l Inst. of
Standards and Tech., Policy Statement on Remedies for Standards-Essential
Patents
Subject
to
Voluntary
F/RAND
Commitments
(2019),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/SEP%20policy%20statement%20signed.pdf [hereinafter Policy Statement].
10. Id. at 5 (“[G]ood faith in negotiations involving F/RAND commitments, supported by availability of data and application of best practices, can
promote licensing efficiency, just as it can in negotiations involving commitments for patents that are not essential to standards.”).
11. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 4, at 2.
Additionally, the Agencies state: “(a) for the purpose of antitrust analysis, the
Agencies apply the same analysis to conduct involving intellectual property as
to conduct involving other forms of property, taking into account the specific
characteristics of a particular property right; (b) the Agencies do not presume
that intellectual property creates market power in the antitrust context . . . .”
Id.
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take advantage of adopters conforming to technology standards;
(3) patent holders build “patent thickets,” have “blocking patents,” and cause the related “Tragedy of the Anti-Commons” because licensing complementary inventions creates coordination
problems for adopters; and (4) to address these alleged problems,
antitrust authorities should encourage patent holders to form
what this article will term “regulatory patent pools” that address
various public policy objectives.
These four misguided antitrust policy concerns are based on
erroneous economic reasoning and inaccurate descriptions of
markets and institutions. Despite this, these four antitrust concerns have been influential in agency policies and legal cases.
“Royalty stacking” appears in antitrust agency reports12 and
prominent legal cases such as Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Ericsson v. D-Link, and Unwired Planet v. Huawei.13 SEP and patent
“hold-up” are cited in antitrust agency reports14 and a large
number of legal cases,15 including Ericsson v. D-Link, Huawei v.
ZTE, and Unwired Planet v. Huawei.16 “Patent thickets” are discussed in various antitrust agency reports17 and addressed by
the Affordable Prescriptions for Patients (APP) Act proposed to
the Senate in 2019 by Senators John Cornyn (R-TX) and Richard

12. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION
AND COMPETITION 8, 61 (2007), http://www.ftc.gov/reports/innovation/

P040101PromotingInnovationandCompetitionrpt0704.pdf.
13. See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL
2111217 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013); Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773
F.3d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Techs. Co.
[2017] EWHC 711 (Pat).
14. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 12,
at 8, 35 n.11; Fed. Trade Comm’n, The Evolving IP Marketplace: Aligning Patent
Notice
and
Remedies
with
Competition
5,
22
(2011),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/evolving-ip-marketplace-aligning-patent-notice-and-remedies-competition-report-federaltrade/110307patentreport.pdf.
15. From 2007 to 2018 about 140 U.S. legal cases involving SEPs mention
patent “hold-up.” See J. Gregory Sidak, Is Patent Holdup a Hoax?, 3 CRITERION
J. ON INNOVATION 401, 476–77 fig.3 (2018).
16. Ericsson, Inc., 773 F.3d 1201; Case C-170/13, Huawei Technologies Co.
v. ZTE Corp., ECLI:EU:C:2014:2391 (November 20, 2014); Unwired Planet Int’l
Ltd. v. Huawei Techs. Co. [2017] EWHC 711 (Pat).
17. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER
BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 6 (2003),
http://ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf [hereinafter 2003 FTC IP Report];
Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 14, at 56.
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Blumenthal (D-CT).18 The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in an antitrust report states that “two mutually
blocking patents are complementary from a legal point of
view.”19 “Blocking patents” are considered in various cases such
as Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Roxane Laboratories, Inc., decided in 2018.20
Finally, advocates urge antitrust policy makers to push for
“regulatory patent pools” as a means of achieving public policy
objectives.21 The argument is that “regulatory patent pools” decrease royalties in comparison to the market for patent license
agreements.22 A USPTO report suggested biotechnology patent
pools as solutions to “royalty stacking” and “blocking patents.”23
18. Cornyn, Blumenthal Introduce Bill to Prevent Drug Companies from
Abusing
Patent
System,
CORNYN.SENATE.GOV
(May
9,
2019),
https://www.cornyn.senate.gov/content/news/cornyn-blumenthal-introducebill-prevent-drug-companies-abusing-patent-system (“To help prevent drug
companies from deliberately abusing the patent system, the Affordable Prescriptions for Patients Act would codify definitions of product hopping and patent thicketing within the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act.”); Susannah
Luthi & Sarah Owermohle, ‘Patent Thicket’ Bill Caught in Tug-of-War over
Drug Pricing Reforms, POLITICO (Oct. 25, 2019), https://www.politico.com/news/2019/10/25/patent-thicket-bill-caught-in-tug-of-war-over-drugpricing-reforms-056858; Steve Brachmann, Affordable Prescriptions for Patients Act Would Allow FTC to Prosecute Pharma Patent Thickets, Product Hopping, IPWATCHDOG (May 20, 2019), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/05/20/affordable-prescriptions-patients-act-allow-ftc-prosecute-pharmaceutical-patentthickets-product-hopping/id=109384/.
19. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., PATENT POOLS AND ANTITRUST—A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 4 (2014); see also Communication from the Commission, Guidelines on the Application of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to Technology Transfer Agreements, 2014 O.J. (C
89) 10–11.
20. Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Roxane Labs., Inc., 903 F.3d 1310 (Fed.
Cir. 2018); see also Galderma Labs., L.P. v. Tolmar, Inc., 737 F.3d 731 (Fed. Cir.
2013); Merck & Co., Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir.
2005); Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Hospira, Inc., 874 F.3d 724 (Fed. Cir.
2017).
21. See Richard J. Gilbert, Ties That Bind: Policies to Promote (Good) Patent Pools, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 4 (2010) (“I . . . propose policies that will promote the formation of beneficial patent pools . . . .”); Jorge L. Contreras, Fixing
FRAND: A Pseudo-Pool Approach to Standards-Based Patent Licensing, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 47, 54 (2013) (promoting the use of a “pseudo-pool” approach and
noting that “relatively few standards have utilized pools, most likely because
they require high startup costs and extensive planning.”).
22. See id., at 4 (noting that patent pools have the potential to “lower[] total
royalties relative to independent licensing”).
23. JEANNE CLARK ET AL., U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT
POOLS: A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF ACCESS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENTS?
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The U.S. Antitrust Guidelines identify integrating complementary technologies and clearing blocking positions among the benefits of patent pools but generally focus on preventing anticompetitive effects of patent pools.24 The European Union (EU),
however, suggests both encouragement and the potential for regulation of complementary patent pools: “Measures to encourage
the setting up of pools for key standardi[z]ed technologies should
be encouraged, e.g. facilitating access to pool management offers
and technical assistance by SDO [(standard developing organization)]. The European Commission will consider further
measures if these efforts are ineffective in IoT sectors.”25
The four misguided antitrust concerns appear to be very different at first, but they are all branches from the same tree. The
common source is an economic model that is nearly two hundred
years old.26 The Cournot complementary monopolies model (the
“Cournot model”) makes a prediction known as the “Cournot Effect.”27 The “Cournot Effect” prediction is that total royalties
with complementary inventions will be even greater than what
a monopoly inventor would offer for a bundle of those inventions.28 In short, the “Cournot Effect” involves price distortions
worse than with a bundled monopoly.29
Many academic studies apply the Cournot model to the design of public policy toward patent licensing. The Cournot model
and its prediction of the “Cournot Effect” are the economic basis
8 (2000) (“A first benefit associated with the pooling of patents is the elimination
of problems caused by ‘blocking’ patents or ‘stacking’ licenses.”).
24. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 4, at 30.
25. Setting Out the EU Approach to Standard Essential Patents, at 8, COM
(2017) 712 final (Nov. 29, 2017); see also Communication from the Commission,
supra note 19, at 45 (“Technology pools can produce pro-competitive effects, in
particular by reducing transaction costs and by setting a limit on cumulative
royalties to avoid double marginali[z]ation.”).
26. AUGUSTIN COURNOT, RESEARCHES INTO THE MATHEMATICAL PRINCIPLES OF THE THEORY OF WEALTH, (Nathaniel T. Bacon trans., The Macmillan
Company 1897) (1838). The Cournot complementary monopolies model is based
on Cournot’s output competition model in the same book; it simply relabels outputs as prices.
27. See Daniel F. Spulber, Licensing Standard Essential Patents with
FRAND Commitments: Preparing for 5G Mobile Telecommunications, 18 COLO.
TECH. L.J. 79, 138 (2020).
28. See id. (“Cournot’s theoretical analysis shows that monopolists supplying complementary inputs to competitive downstream producers will choose
prices whose total is greater than what a monopolist would charge for a bundle
of those inputs. This inefficiency is known as the ‘Cournot Effect.’”).
29. See id.
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for “royalty stacking,”30 “SEP hold-up,”31 “patent thickets,”32
“blocking patents,”33 and the “Tragedy of the Anti-Commons.”34
Various studies apply the Cournot model and the “Cournot Effect” to argue that patent pools would choose lower total royalties in comparison to market negotiation of patent license agreements.35 Some studies recommend that antitrust authorities
30. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991, 2013 (2007); Richard Schmalensee, Standard-Setting,
Innovation Specialists and Competition Policy, 57 J. INDUS. ECON. 526, 530
(2009); Yann Meniere & Sarah Parlane, Decentralized Licensing of Complementary Patents: Comparing the Royalty, Fixed-Fee and Two-Part Tariff Regimes,
22 INFO. ECON. & POL’Y 178, 178 (2010); Jorge L. Contreras, Standards, Royalty
Stacking, and Collective Action, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., Mar. 2015, at 2–3;
Gastón Llanes & Joaquín Poblete, Ex Ante Agreements in Standard Setting and
Patent-Pool Formation, 23 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 50, 51 (2014).
31. See Joseph Farrell et al., Standard Setting, Patents, and Hold-Up, 74
ANTITRUST L.J., 603, 641–42 (2007); Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, Standard-Essential Patents, 123 J. POL. ECON. 547, 574 (2015); A. Douglas Melamed & Carl
Shapiro, How Antitrust Law Can Make FRAND Commitments More Effective, 127 YALE L.J. 2110, 2138–39 (2017). A study of land sales obtains the
“Cournot Effect” without citing Cournot’s model. See Wolfgang Eckart, On the
Land Assembly Problem, 18 J. URB. ECON. 364, 371 (1985) (“[C]omplementarity
of the traded goods reverses the conclusions drawn from standard oligopoly theory: collusion turns out to be socially desirable in so far as it favors both sides
of the market.”).
32. See Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent
Pools, and Standard Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POL. & ECON. 119, 122–24 (Adam
B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2001); Ian Ayres & Gideon Parchomovsky, Tradable Patent
Rights, 60 STAN. L. REV. 863, 872 (2007) (“[P]atent thickets present a classic
complements problem.”).
33. See Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements, 34 RAND J.
ECON. 391, 396–97 (2003); Jay Pil Choi, Patent Pools and Cross‐Licensing in the
Shadow of Patent Litigation, 51 INT’L ECON. REV. 441, 447–48 (2010).
34. See James Buchanan & Yong J. Yoon, Symmetric Tragedies: Commons
and Anticommons, 43 J.L. & ECON. 1, 5–10 (2000) (presenting a geometric-algebraic model that shows the non-realized economic value inherent in the anticommons problem is analogous to the “Cournot Effect”); Paul A. David, Mitigating “Anticommons” Harms to Science and Technology Research, 2 WIPO J. 59,
62 (2010).
35. See Shapiro, supra note 32, at 134 (“In many respects, a patent
pool . . . is the purest solution to the complements problem . . . .”); Richard J.
Gilbert, Antitrust for Patent Pools: A Century of Policy Evolution, 2004 STAN.
TECH. L. REV. 3; Gilbert, supra note 21, at 21–22. C.f. Atsushi Kato, Patent Pool
Enhances Market Competition, 24 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 255, 266 (2004) (arguing that a patent pool of substitute patents may raise social welfare, presenting
a slight variation on the “Cournot Effect”); Sung-Hwan Kim, Vertical Structure
and Patent Pools, 25 REV. INDUS. ORG. 231, 248 (2004) (applying the “Cournot
model” to the analysis of the interaction between vertically integrated firms and
patent pools to conclude it leads to the reductions of double marginalization and
lowers incentive to raise rivals’ costs); Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, Public Policy
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promote “regulatory patent pools” as a means of controlling patent license royalties and imposing arbitrary technology benchmarks.36 Gilbert states that “antitrust authorities and the courts
should encourage policies that promote the formation and durability of beneficial pools that combine complementary patents . . . .”37 Contreras calls for the formation of pseudo patent
pools that would choose patent royalties before technology
standards are established.38
This article shows that the “Cournot Effect” should not be
used as a basis for antitrust policy toward patent licensing. The
Cournot model makes several unrealistic and extreme assumptions about markets and institutions. These assumptions are
highly misleading in the context of patent licensing. The Cournot
model assumes that patent holders set license royalties through

Toward Patent Pools, 8 INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 157, 177 (2007); Steffen
Brenner, Optimal Formation Rules for Patent Pools, 40 ECON. THEORY 373, 374
(2009); Vianney Dequiedt & Bruno Versaevel, Pools and the Dynamic R&D Incentives, 36 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 59, 66 (2013) (showing patent pools stimulate
research and development and accelerate the rate at which essential technologies reach market and benefit consumers); Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, Efficient
Patent Pools, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 691, 706 (2004) (arguing that patent pools increase welfare if patents are complimentary); Choi, supra note 33, at 447;
Llanes & Poblete, supra note 30, at 63 (finding that patent pools formed after a
standard is chosen may negatively impact welfare even when complimentary);
Gastón Llanes & Stefano Trento, Patent Policy, Patent Pools and the Accumulation of Claims, 50 ECON. THEORY 703, 706 (2012) (explaining that pools of
complementary patents increase welfare with “endogenous innovation”); Klaus
Schmidt, Standards, Innovation Incentives, and the Formation of Patent Pools
(GESY, Working Paper No. 342, 2010), http://www.sfbtr15.de/uploads/media/342.pdf (“[P]atent pools can play an important role in lowering royalties,
reducing transaction costs, disseminating new technologies, and fostering innovation incentives.”); Klaus Schmidt, Complementary Patents and Market Structure, 23 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 68, 70 (2014) (“We conclude that the current shift in U.S. competition policy to permit patent pools for complementary
patents is a move in the right direction.”).
36. See Shapiro, supra note 32, at 123 (“This basic theory of complements
(used in fixed proportions) gives strong support for businesses to adopt, and for
competition authorities to welcome, either cross licensees, package licenses, or
patent pools to clear such blocking positions.”); Gilbert, supra note 21, at 45.
C.f. Contreras, supra note 21, at 94 (“This proposal calls for the encouragement
of joint ex ante negotiation of royalty rates prior to lock-in of a standard, conduct
that has been viewed favorably by several regulatory agencies and acknowledged as offering various procompetitive benefits.”).
37. Gilbert, supra note 21, at 45.
38. Contreras, supra note 21, at 63.
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“take-it-or-leave-it” pricing.39 The Cournot model assumes that
royalties are constant per unit of output, ruling out lump-sum
payments and various contingent arrangements.40 The Cournot
model assumes that the product market has 100% cost passthrough because it assumes that market supply is infinitely elastic.41 The Cournot model further assumes that patent holders
have 100% market power in the market for patent licenses and
in the downstream product market.42 This combination of implausible assumptions generates the “Cournot Effect.”43
The present analysis shows that negotiation in a competitive market eliminates, and indeed reverses, the “Cournot Effect.” Market negotiation of patent license agreements removes
the basis for “royalty stacking,” “SEP hold-up,” “patent thickets,”
and the “Tragedy of the Anti-Commons.” Market negotiation of
patent licenses also obviates the need for antitrust authorities to
promote “regulatory patent pools” as a means of solving these
alleged antitrust problems. The market negotiation framework
presented here holds generally for any cost pass-through of less
than 100% and for any patent holder bargaining power of less
than 100%. The predictions of the market negotiation framework
conform much more closely to observed market outcomes than
the Cournot model.
Antitrust policy concerns based on the “Cournot Effect” are
misguided because the underlying economic analysis does not
apply to markets for patent licensing. In addition, the predicted
“Cournot Effect” offers highly inaccurate descriptions of the market for patent licenses. Antitrust policy should be based on economic models that are consistent with market institutions and
reflect empirical analysis of market conditions. Antitrust policy
39. See Spulber, supra note 27, at 138 (“The theoretical ‘Cournot Effect’ is
the result of assuming that complementary monopolists offer take-it-or-leave-it
prices to producers.”).
40. See Daniel F. Spulber, Finding Reasonable Royalty Damages: A Contract Approach to Patent Infringement, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 615, 696 (“[T]he
‘Cournot Effect’ is based on the assumption that complementary input monopolists choose ‘posted prices.’ This means that the input monopolists announce
prices that they will charge to downstream producers.’”).
41. See Daniel F. Spulber, Complementary Monopolies and Bargaining, 60
J.L. & ECON. 29, 42 (2017) (“In Cournot’s model, input suppliers choose prices ri
(i = 1, . . . , n), and downstream producers choose how much of the inputs to
purchase.”).
42. See id.
43. See generally COURNOT, supra note 26 (establishing the economic principle of the “Cournot Effect”).
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should recognize that patent license agreements are formed
through negotiation rather than “take-it-or-leave-it” prices. Antitrust policy also should recognize that the market power of patent holders is less than 100% and cost-pass through for royalties is less than 100%.
Table 1 summarizes the discussion. The discussion is organized as follows. Section II examines why patent license agreements are negotiated and considers how negotiation affects the
provisions of patent license agreements. Section III explains the
Cournot model and shows how its application to patent licensing
is misleading for antitrust policy. Section IV examines the antitrust policy implications of negotiation in the market for patent
licensing. Section V concludes the discussion.

ANTITRUST
POLICY
Antitrust policy toward patent licensing

FRAMEWORK

FRAMEWORK

NEGOTIATION

TAKE-IT-ORLEAVE-IT PRICING

Bilateral negotiation
of patent license contracts

Cournot complementary
monopolies
model applied to patent licensing

Reverses “Cournot Effect”

“Cournot Effect”

Total royalties are less
than a bundling monopolist patent holder.
Royalties and prices are
efficient.

ANTITRUST

Neutral policy

POLICY

Patent pools offer total
royalties that are less
than a bundling monopolist patent holder.

Antitrust policy toward patent pools

Patent pools serve to
mitigate
transaction
costs.

(1) “Royalty stacking”,
(2) “SEP holdup”,
(3) “Patent thickets”,
“Blocking
patents”,
“Tragedy of the AntiCommons”.
(4) Encourage “regulatory patent pools”
Patent pools offer total
royalties that are the
same as a bundling monopolist patent holder.

Table 1. Antitrust policies toward patent licensing
and patent pools
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II. NEGOTIATION OF PATENT LICENSE AGREEMENTS
Practically all patent license agreements are negotiated,
with the exception of those offered by patent pools. This section
examines why patent license agreements are negotiated and introduces a negotiation framework. The analysis shows that negotiated patent license agreements are efficient in competitive
markets. With complementary inventions, total royalties are
less than what a bundled monopoly inventor would offer. The
discussion also explains that patent pools serve to mitigate
transaction costs.
A. WHY PATENT LICENSE AGREEMENTS ARE NEGOTIATED
Patent license agreements require negotiation because they
are contracts between patent holders and technology adopters.44
Patent license agreements resist standardization because the
provisions of the contract are tailored to the characteristics and
requirements of the parties.45 Each patent licensing agreement
includes rights and obligations specific to the combination of the
licensor and licensee.46 This explains the considerable variation
across patent license agreements.47
Technology provides another source of variation across patent license agreements. The patented technology is necessarily
unique to the patent holder because inventions must be novel

44. See Daniel F. Spulber, Intellectual Contract and Intellectual Law, 23 J.
TECH. L. & POL’Y 1, 18 (2018) (“Through [Intellectual Contracts] such as licensing agreements, patent holders and technology adopters determine how technology will be applied. Firms require [Intellectual Contracts] to form agreements with employees, suppliers, partners, distributors, investors, and
customers.”); Spulber, supra note 40, at 620 (“[A] patent license agreement is a
contract.”) (emphasis original).
45. Raymond C. Nordhaus, Patent License Agreements, 21 BUS. LAW. 643,
643 (1966) (“Because of the infinite variety of rights and obligations that may
be established between a patent licensor and his licensee, there is no ‘standard’
form of license agreement that may be used in all situations. Each license agreement must be carefully tailored to the specific circumstances of the particular
case.”).
46. See generally ANATOLE KRATTIGER ET AL., Contracts and Agreements to
Support Partnerships, in GUIDE TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT IN
HEALTH AND AGRICULTURAL INNOVATION: A HANDBOOK OF BEST PRACTICES
(2007), www.ipHandbook.org (explaining contracting and appropriate provisions for intellectual property).
47. See Christian Bessy & Eric Brousseau, Technology Licensing Contracts:
Features and Diversity, 18 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 451, 470 (1998).
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and non-obvious.48 The benefits from applying that unique technology likely will vary across adopters because adopters operate
different businesses. This implies that the combination of the licensor’s technology with the licensee’s application and business
characteristics is likely to produce unique outcomes and variation across patent license agreements.
Negotiation is required because the purpose of the agreement is to maximize the parties’ gains from trade generated by
the technology transfer.49 These gains from trade depend on the
characteristics of the technology provided by the patent holder
and the profit generated by the adopter’s application of the technology.50 Ronald Coase emphasized that negotiation allows parties to reach efficient agreements by adjusting for the allocation
of property ownership and legal constraints.51 The parties to patent license agreements adjust for the allocation of intellectual
property (IP) and the effects of patent law and other regulatory
restrictions.
Further, negotiation of patent license agreements is necessary because these licenses are contracts rather than immediate
transactions.52 The adoption and application of technology takes
time. It takes time for technology adopters to obtain market returns to innovation. The technology adopter may need to invest
resources to understand and absorb the new technology.53 This
can involve hiring and training employees, investing in capital

48. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103 (2018).
49. See ANATOLE KRATTIGER ET AL., Technology and Product Licensing, in
GUIDE TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT IN HEALTH AND AGRICULTURAL INNOVATION: A HANDBOOK OF BEST PRACTICES (2007), www.ipHandbook.org.
50. C.f. Daniel F. Spulber, How Patents Provide the Foundation of the Market for Inventions, 11 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 271, 291 (2015) (“The interaction of
demand and supply in the market for innovation control determines the market
value of inventions. Inventors compete to supply producers with inventions, and
producers compete to obtain inventions or develop their own inventions. The
market value of an invention reflects competition from both substitute and complementary inventions on the supply side of the market for inventions. The market value of inventions depends on the stock of inventions and anticipation of
future discoveries that may enhance the demand for particular inventions or
render those inventions obsolete.”).
51. Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 8 (1960).
52. See, e.g., ANATOLE KRATTIGER ET AL., supra note 46, at 85.
53. See Daniel F. Spulber, Tacit Knowledge with Innovative Entrepreneurship, 30 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 641, 644 (2012).
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equipment, and acquiring complementary technologies.54 The
technology adopter may develop inventions that are complementary to the transferred technology. The technology adopter may
also develop innovations that apply the transferred technology.
The technology adopter may realize the revenues and cost savings from the new technology over some period of time.
Because application of the technology takes time, the provisions of the patent license agreement typically reflect repeated
interactions in the context of the business relationship between
the patent holder and the technology implementer. Radauer and
Dudenbostel emphasize the need for negotiation because “considerable interaction must take place between licensors and licensees, on a bilateral and rather informal level.”55 Krattiger et
al. observe that, “[i]n sum, licensing is about the development of
relationships. As important as the terms of agreements are, few
are more important than the long-term opportunities offered by
forging good partnerships . . . . Negotiating an agreement is just
the beginning of what may—or should—become a long-lasting
and beneficial relationship.”56
Application of inventions involves risk because the properties of new technologies are not fully understood. The combination of inventions to generate innovative products involves various types of risk as well.57 There are risks involved in the
designing of new products, developing new production processes,
and using new transaction methods.58 The market risks of

54. Spulber, supra note 50, at 295 (“The market for innovative control also
provides incentives to invest efficiently in complementary assets. Assets that
are complementary to inventions include human resources, absorption of inventions, IP, product design, capital equipment, marketing, sales, procurement,
and establishment of new firms.”).
55. ALFRED RADAUER & TOBIAS DUDENBOSTEL, EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
EUR 26114 EN PATLICE SURVEY: SURVEY ON PATENT LICENSING ACTIVITIES
BY PATENTING FIRMS 51 (2013), http://ec.europa.eu/research/innovation-union/pdf/patlice-survey.pdf.
56. ANATOLE KRATTIGER ET AL., supra note 46, at 128.
57. Cf. F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 703 (2001) (“[T]he treatment of patents
as property rights is necessary to facilitate investment in the complex, costly,
and risky commercialization activities required to turn nascent inventions into
new goods and services.”).
58. Cf. id. at 707–08 (“The invention must be developed into some commercial embodiment. Capital may have to be raised. Production facilities and labor
must be made available. Distribution channels must be created. Consumers
must be educated about the existence and benefits of this new good or service.”).
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introducing innovations can be greater than for existing products, production processes, and transaction methods.59
Negotiation of patent licensing agreements is necessary because licensing often occurs where invention meets innovation.
There is empirical evidence for complementarities between internal research and development (R&D) and the acquisition of
external knowledge.60 The IP owner provides inventions created
through R&D.61 The IP adopter provides applications for the inventions and complementary assets.62 Innovation occurs when
the application of invention introduces something new to the
market.63
Patent license contracts are the basis of the “market for innovative control.”64 Patent holders not only receive returns to
their inventions but also exercise control over how the invention
will be improved, commercialized, applied in innovation, and
used in production.65 Ownership of assets includes both financial
returns and control rights.66 The same applies to IP.67 Patent

59. Id. at 708–09 (noting that later entrants to the market frequently bear
less risk).
60. See Ashish Arora & Alfonso Gambardella, Complementarity and External Linkages: The Strategies of the Large Firms in Biotechnology, 38 J. INDUS.
ECON. 361, 373–74 (1990); Iain M. Cockburn & Rebecca M. Henderson, Absorptive Capacity, Coauthoring Behavior and the Organization of Research in Drug
Discovery, 46 J. INDUS. ECON. 157, 158 (1998); Marco Ceccagnoli et al., Productivity and the Role of Complementary Assets in Firms’ Demand for Technology
Innovations, 19 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 839, 863–64 (2010); Marco Ceccagnoli
et al., Behind the Scenes: Sources of Complementarity in R&D, 23 J. ECON. &
MGMT. STRATEGY 125, 144 (2014); Bruno Cassiman & Reinhilde Veugelers, In
Search of Complementarity in Innovation Strategy: Internal R&D and External
Knowledge Acquisition, 52 MGMT. SCI. 68, 80 (2006).
61. See Spulber, supra note 50, at 297 (“Inventors create inventions by applying effort, knowledge, ingenuity, capabilities, insights, and scientific observations. If R&D is successful, the discovery may be valuable in commercial applications or as an input to further R&D.”).
62. See id. at 294 (“The market for innovative control also allows the entry
of specialized intermediaries who can invest in commercialization, innovation,
and complementary assets.”).
63. See Marshall Leaffer, Patent Misuse and Innovation, 10 J. HIGH TECH.
L. 142, 142 (2010) (“Innovation therefore differs from invention. It includes not
only the initial discovery or the creation of potential new products or processes,
but also their subsequent development and commercialization.”) (citations omitted).
64. See Spulber, supra note 50, at 274.
65. See id.
66. See id. at 290.
67. See id. at 290–91.
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holders receive returns from licensing and their own use.68 Patent holders also have rights of control.69 For this reason, the
market value of a patent reflects both financial returns and control rights.70 The price of transferred patents reflects the value
of financial returns and control rights.
The licensor delegates some innovative control to the licensee. The patent licensing contract grants rights to practice the
invention to the licensee.71 The patent licensing contract specifies consideration, usually in the form of patent royalties to the
licensor.72 Consideration is based on the IP adopter’s expected
returns from innovation.73 The IP owner also may innovate by
making improvements on the invention.74 The interaction between invention and innovation through patent licensing contracts has a number of implications.75
Companies that are patent holders occasionally make announcements regarding expected royalties, but these announcements usually are initial bargaining positions that differ substantially from the outcomes of negotiations between patent
owners and producers.76 Stasik observes that “an ‘announced’
royalty rate may be significantly different than the ‘actual’ royalty rate resulting from a bi-lateral negotiation. Having made a
public announcement, a potential licensee might reasonably expect this to be the opening offer in a negotiation. That is all that
should be assumed from these announcements.”77 In discussing
LTE royalties, Stasik predicts that “[t]hose companies who have
negotiation power will pay less—the best ones will pay much
68. Id. at 290.
69. Id.
70. See id. at 290–93.
71. Id. at 295 (“[T]he market for innovative control allows separation of
ownership and control. The patent owner can obtain returns from the patented
invention while delegating control over innovation to licensees who employ the
technology.”).
72. See Gerard Llobet & Jorge Padilla, The Optimal Scope of the Royalty
Base in Patent Licensing, 59 J.L. & ECON. 45, 45 (2016).
73. See Spulber, supra note 40, at 618.
74. See Spulber, supra note 50, at 274.
75. See generally Spulber, supra note 50 (discussing how patents and patent licensing creates a “market of inventions” that includes the various methods of innovating based on the patented inventions).
76. See Eric Stasik, Royalty Rates and Licensing Strategies for Essential
Patents on LTE (4G) Telecommunication Standards, 2010 NOUVELLES 114,
116–17 (2010).
77. Id. at 116–117.
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less.”78 Bargaining power is an important determinant of patent
license royalties.79
Negotiation of patent license contracts is necessary because
new business agreements require creativity. Goldscheider’s
guide to negotiating IP license agreements suggests that such
agreements “should be creative in both organization and structure.”80 Goldscheider finds that “by combining resources from
several aspects of various intra-party business dealings, practitioners can frequently generate greater income for both parties
to a negotiation.”81 He argues that royalty rates should not be
standardized because “royalties are essentially an expression of
underlying contemplated profitability.”82 Goldscheider warns
that that “a ‘bad’ royalty standard drives out innovation in industry.”83
There is considerable empirical evidence that parties negotiate IP license contracts. The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and the International Trade Centre (ITC)
provide a training manual (“WIPO Manual”) that is devoted to
license negotiation.84 Referring to the royalty rate in license
agreements, the WIPO Manual states “[i]t is important that the
rate results in a good business proposition for both parties, and
so negotiation of the royalty rate is fundamental to the success
of the agreement.”85 The WIPO manual further observes “[a] successful ongoing relationship is based on a contract with mutually
acceptable terms. In this context, the importance of negotiation
cannot be underestimated.”86 The WIPO manual points out that
negotiating a technology licensing agreement is an art.87

78. Id.
79. Mariko Sakakibara, An Empirical Analysis of Pricing in Patent Licensing Contracts, 19 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 927, 927–45 (2010).
80. Robert Goldscheider, The Negotiation of Royalties and Other Sources of
Income from Licensing, 36 IDEA 1, 1 (1995).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 16.
83. Id. at 16 n.6.
84. WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. & INT’L TRADE CTR., EXCHANGING VALUE,
NEGOTIATING TECHNOLOGY LICENSING AGREEMENTS: A TRAINING MANUAL
(WIPO publication No. 906(E), Jan. 2005).
85. Id. at 57.
86. Id. at 10.
87. Id. at 82 (“Negotiating a technology licensing agreement is the art of
reaching an agreement where the licensor grants and the licensee acquires the
right to use the licensor’s technology on specified terms and conditions.”).
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The European Patent Office (EPO) Handbook for Inventors
explains in great detail how to negotiate licensing agreements.88
Significantly, the EPO handbook does not offer any discussion of
“take-it-or-leave-it” royalties or standardized contracts. According to the EPO, negotiation of a licensing agreement usually involves two stages.89 First, the “heads of agreement” stage identifies the terms and conditions of the agreement.90 Second, at the
full agreement stage, the parties prepare the legal agreement
based on the heads of agreement.91
Although the parties to a licensing agreement negotiate royalties, these are but one aspect of the agreement. The main focus
of licensing contracts is on maximizing mutual benefits; the royalties are a way of dividing those benefits. As Goldscheider
points out, “royalty rates are merely expressions, or mechanical
forms of calculation, employed by parties when making decisions
or assumptions based upon profitability.”92 According to
Schroeder,
[i]n reality, most royalties represent an effort to divide between the
licensee and the licensor the expected profit on the licensed product
above the usual profit of the licensee on products of this type. When
the advantage of the invention is a cost savings for the licensee (common in the case of a licensed process), the royalty represents a division
of the savings.93

Epstein and Malherbe also emphasize that royalties are negotiated and observe that negotiated royalties depend on the
availability of alternatives and design-arounds, cost savings,
and investment in commercialization and innovation.94 They
point out that negotiated royalties “may be part of a complex
transaction that includes joint licensing of other patents (i.e.,

88. Negotiating a Licensing Agreement, EUR. PAT. OFF., https://www.
epo.org/learning/materials/inventors-handbook/dealing-with-companies/
licensing.html (last visited Sept. 2, 2016).
89. Reaching Agreement, EUR. PAT. OFF., https://www.epo.org/learning/
materials/inventors-handbook/dealing-with-companies/agreement.html (last
visited Sept. 2, 2016).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Goldscheider, supra note 80, at 1.
93. Robert A. Schroeder, Licensing of Rights to Intellectual Property, 50
ALB. L. REV. 455, 460 (1986).
94. Roy J. Epstein & Paul Malherbe, Reasonable Royalty Patent Infringement Damages After Uniloc, 39 AIPLA Q.J. 3, 8 (2011).
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patent pooling), cross-licenses, know-how, and/or product support.”95
Some attribute negotiation of IP license agreements to the
need for further development of markets for IP. IBM has been a
leading recipient of U.S. patents for almost 25 years.96 IBM’s
chief patent counsel, Manny Schecter, observes that “it’s the leverage we are able to get from the patent [licensing] negotiations.”97 Schecter asks,
[w]hat if there were no Kelley Blue Book for used cars[?] . . . If the marketplace for used cars were the same as the market for patents it would
be very frustrating. We tolerate this in the IP marketplace because we
are in the early stages of the development of the marketplace. What
must it have been like 50 years ago when you would buy a used
car? The amount of information available for the ordinary person was
pretty slim.98

Schecter explains that “he doesn’t expect full transparency
because licensing negotiations and litigation settlements go on
privately.”99
Negotiation also is a fundamental element of cross licensing
for IBM. For example, IBM entered into a cross licensing deal
with Western Digital in 2016.100 According to William LaFontaine, general manager of intellectual property for IBM, “[t]his
agreement with Western Digital illustrates the value of patented
IBM inventions and demonstrates our leadership in licensing access to our broad patent portfolio. We look forward to a productive relationship with Western Digital.”101
Nonprofit institutions also negotiate patent license agreements. A study of university licensing by Siegel et al. observes

95. Id.
96. Daryl K. Taft, IBM Inks Patent Cross-License Deal with Western Digital, EWEEK (Jan. 25, 2016), https://www.eweek.com/it-management/ibm-inkspatent-cross-license-deal-with-western-digital.
97. Khurram Aziz, The Most Innovative Firm in the World: IBM’s Patent
Strategy,
INTELL.
PROP.
MAG.
(Feb.
1,
2012),
https://www.intellectualpropertymagazine.com/patent/the-most-innovativefirm-in-the-world-ibm-s-patent-strategy-90180.htm.
98. Gene Quinn, IBM’s Formula for Success: Patents, Patents and More Patents,
IP
WATCHDOG
(Jan.
11,
2012),
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2012/01/11/ibms-formula-for-success-patents-patents-and-more-patents/id=21722/.
99. Id.
100. See Darryl K. Taft, supra note 96 (discussing generally the patent deal
between IBM and Western Digital).
101. Taft, supra note 96.
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that once a patent has been awarded, the technology transfer
office (TTO) markets the technology to potential corporate licensees: “The next stage of the model involves working with firms
or entrepreneurs to negotiate a licensing agreement.”102 Jensen
and Thursby find that auctions are not a good description of licensing by universities because TTOs experience difficulties in
locating licensees for early stage inventions, which is what is
usually licensed by universities.103
Government agencies also negotiate patent license agreements. For example, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) negotiates royalties for all of its licenses:
“All NASA licenses are individually negotiated with the prospective licensee, and each license contains terms concerning transfer (practical application), license duration, royalties, and periodic reporting.”104 At the Department of Energy, the Agreement
for Commercializing Technology (ACT) allows contractors who
operate government-owned laboratories “to negotiate terms and
conditions that are more consistent with private industry practice, such as IP rights, payment arrangements, indemnification,
and development of multi-party R&D partnerships.”105
The Courts recognize that patent license agreements are negotiated. The Courts often calculate reasonable royalty damages
from patent infringement based on the hypothetical negotiation
between a willing licensor and a willing licensee. The hypothetical negotiation framework is inconsistent with evidence because
it is based on conjectures about what the parties would have expected before infringement began.106 Imagining a hypothetical
negotiation imposes an impossible burden on the court because
it must construct expectations that would not have been available even to the parties involved. Rather, the reasonable royalty

102. Donald S. Siegel et al., Toward a Model of the Effective Transfer of Scientific Knowledge from Academicians to Practitioners: Qualitative Evidence
from the Commercialization of University Technologies, 21 J. ENG’G & TECH.
MGMT. 115, 118 (2004).
103. Richard Jensen & Marie Thursby, Proofs and Prototypes for Sale: The
Licensing of University Inventions, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 240, 245 (2001).
104. How to License an Ames Patent or Patent Application, NASA,
https://technology-arc.ndc.nasa.gov/licensing (last visited Aug. 24, 2014).
105. NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & TECH., RETURN ON INVESTMENT INITIATIVE
FOR
UNLEASHING AMERICAN INNOVATION 61 n.158 (Apr. 2019),
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.1234.
106. Daniel F. Spulber, Finding Reasonable Royalty Damages: A Contract
Approach to Patent Infringement, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 615, 656 (2019).
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damages should be based on constructing an “informed contract”
applying the evidence uncovered by the patent case.107 The “informed contract” reflects the characteristics of the parties in the
patent dispute, the extent of the infringement, and the patents
having been found to be valid and infringed upon.108
Many legal decisions emphasize negotiation of patent license agreements. The influential Georgia-Pacific case sets forth
fifteen factors that might be used to estimate royalties from a
hypothetical negotiation.109 The last factor recognizes that royalties are established through negotiation:
The amount that a licensor (such as the patentee) and a licensee (such
as the infringer) would have agreed upon (at the time the infringement
began) if both had been reasonably and voluntarily trying to reach an
agreement; that is, the amount which a prudent licensee — who desired, as a business proposition, to obtain a license to manufacture and
sell a particular article embodying the patented invention — would
have been willing to pay as a royalty and yet be able to make a reasonable profit and which amount would have been acceptable by a prudent
patentee who was willing to grant a license.110

Judge Tenney points out that patent license negotiation
takes place within the context of market forces.111 The Georgia
Pacific factors include the other terms of the contract and the
characteristics of the licensor and the licensee.112
107. Id. at 623.
108. Id.
109. See Ga.-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120
(S.D.N.Y. 1970).
110. Id. at 1120 (Tenney, J.) (“The rule is more a statement of approach than
a tool of analysis. It requires consideration not only of the amount that a willing
licensee would have paid for the patent license but also of the amount that a
willing licensor would have accepted. What a willing licensor and a willing licensee would have agreed upon in a supposititious negotiation for a reasonable
royalty would entail consideration of the specific factors previously mentioned,
to the extent of their relevance.”).
111. Id. at 1121 (Tenney, J.) (“Where a willing licensor and a willing licensee
are negotiating for a royalty, the hypothetical negotiations would not occur in a
vacuum of pure logic. They would involve a market place confrontation of the
parties, the outcome of which would depend upon such factors as their relative
bargaining strength; the anticipated amount of profits that the prospective licensor reasonably thinks he would lose as a result of licensing the patent as
compared to the anticipated royalty income; the anticipated amount of net profits that the prospective licensee reasonably thinks he will make; the commercial
past performance of the invention in terms of public acceptance and profits; the
market to be tapped; and any other economic factor that normally prudent businessmen would, under similar circumstances, take into consideration in negotiating the hypothetical license.”).
112. Id. at 1120.
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Negotiation of patent license contracts is the primary means
of settling patent disputes. Lanjouw and Schankerman find that
95% of patent disputes are settled out of court.113 The terms of
the patent license agreement depend on various factors including legal costs, reasonable royalty damages for patent infringement, and the likelihood that an infringement lawsuit will be
successful.114 Kesan and Ball observe, “[o]bviously, an out-ofcourt negotiation of a licensing agreement is similar to a negotiation of a settlement agreement once the case has been filed.”115
Implementers of technology standards often must negotiate
licenses with many holders of SEPs. Combining complementary
inventions entails substantial coordination costs.116 Creating
complex innovations requires technology providers and implementers to engage in many interrelated market transactions.117
Producer profits depend on the provisions of multiple IP contracts.118 Also, the technical specifications of parts, components,
products, and services must allow compatibility and interoperability.119 To address these coordination costs, industries establish standards organizations and create technology standards.120

113. Jean O. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Protecting Intellectual Property Rights: Are Small Firms Handicapped?, 47 J.L. ECON. 45, 48 (stating that
“lowering the cost of enforcement is the fact that postfiling settlement rates are
high (about 95 percent) and that most settlement occurs soon after the suit is
filed, often before the pretrial hearing is held.”).
114. Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are Patent Cases Resolved? An
Empirical Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes, 84 WASH. U.L. REV. 237, 243 (2006) (stating that in deciding whether to
litigate or license, economic theory favors weighing various factors to determine
potential costs and benefits).
115. Id. at 254.
116. Gupta, supra note 6, at 844–45 (discussing how complex technologies
involve negotiating multiple licenses which may increase transaction costs).
117. Id. at 844 (“[I]t is widely understood that the nature of complex technologies involves many patents owned by different parties reading on single
product.”).
118. Id. (discussing the effects of “royalty stacking” on downstream manufacturers of complex technologies).
119. Daniel F. Spulber, Innovation Economics: The Interplay Among Technology Standards, Competitive Conduct, and Economic Performance, 9 J. COMP.
L. & ECON. 777, 788–90 (2013) (explaining the economic benefits and desirability of modularity in technological systems and that interoperability is necessary
to modularity).
120. See Daniel F. Spulber, Licensing Standard Essential Patents with
FRAND Commitments: Preparing for 5G Mobile Telecommunications, 18.1
COLO. TECH. L.J. 79, 82–83 (2020) (stating that industries create Standard
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Negotiation is the basis of the requirement that holders of
standard essential patents (SEPs) license on terms that are
“Fair, Reasonable And Non-Discriminatory” (FRAND). Standard setting organizations (SSOs) require SEP holders to commit
to licenses on terms that are FRAND as a condition for including
their patents in technology standards.121 SSOs include standard
development organizations (SDOs), umbrella organizations, and
industry consortia.122 SSOs do not spell out the meaning or implications of FRAND commitments but instead rely on market
negotiation to determine the content of FRAND commitments.123
There is considerable evidence that SEP holders and implementers negotiate patent license agreements.124 The large number of
SEPs and the widespread implementation of technology standards indicate the significant scope of the market for patent license agreements.125 Market negotiation of SEP licenses generally involves bilateral negotiation between each SEP holder and
each implementer.126
Intermediated transactions in the market for patent license
contracts typically involve negotiation. Intermediaries reduce
transaction costs and offer the convenience of one-stop shopping.127 Intermediaries may achieve greater transaction efficiencies and bargaining power in patent licensing negotiation than

Setting Organizations that facilitate development of technology standards, and
broadly outlining the effects of technology standards).
121. Id. at 82.
122. Id. at 86.
123. Id. at 83.
124. TIM POHLMANN & KNUT BLIND, LANDSCAPING STUDY ON STANDARD ESSENTIAL PATENTS (SEPS) 36, (2016), https://www.iplytics.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Pohlmann_IPlytics_2017_EU-report_landscaping-SEPs.pdf
(stating the majority of SEPs are individually licensed, partially out of fear that
negotiating leverage will be lost in a patent pool).
125. Spulber, supra note 120, at 121–22.
126. See J. Gregory. Sidak, The Meaning of FRAND, Part I: Royalties, 9(4) J.
COMPETITION L. ECON. 931, 985 (2013) (“The hypothetical negotiation at the
time of standard adoption is properly cast as a series of simultaneous, bilateral
negotiations between the SEP holder and each of the implementers.”).
127. Naomi R. Lamoreaux & Kennith L. Sokoloff, Intermediaries in the U.S.
Market for Technology, 1870–1920, in FINANCE, INTERMEDIARIES, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 209, 209–13 (Stanley L. Engerman et al. eds., 2003). See
generally James F. McDonough III, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An Alternative
View of the Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY L.J. 189,
189–228 (2006) (arguing there is greater market efficiency as a result of intermediaries).
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individual patent holders.128 Hagiu and Yoffie observe “[t]he patent market consists mainly of bilateral transactions, either
sales or cross-licenses, between large companies. Such deals are
privately negotiated and might involve hundreds or thousands
of patents.”129 An FTC study of “Patent Assertion Entities”
(PAEs) found substantial reliance on negotiation.130
B. WHY NEGOTIATION MATTERS FOR PATENT LICENSING
This section introduces a patent licensing negotiation
framework. The main insight is that with negotiation, royalties
are strictly less than what would be chosen by a monopolist licensing the bundle of complementary inventions. This establishes that patent licensing with complementary inventions
should not be viewed as an antitrust problem.
In the negotiation framework, royalties are established
through negotiation by pairs of patent holders and technology
adopters. The negotiation framework recognizes that patent
holders do not make commitments in the form of take-it-orleave-it royalty offers. The analysis is sufficiently general that it
allows a patent holder and a technology adopter to have asymmetric bargaining power. The analysis allows patent holders to
have any relative bargaining power greater than zero and less
than 100%.
The downstream product market is presumed to be perfectly
competitive as in the textbook model of supply and demand. This
means that the market price in the product market is such that
total demand equals total supply. Buyers choose the quantity of
128. See Erica S. Mintzer & Suzanne Munck, The Joint U.S. Department of
Justice and Federal Trade Commission Workshop on Patent Assertion Entity
Activities—“Follow the Money,” 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 423, 429 (2014); John E. Dubiansky, The Licensing Function of Patent Intermediaries, 15 DUKE L. & TECH.
REV. 269, 271 (2017).
129. Andrei Hagiu & David B. Yoffie, The New Patent Intermediaries: Platforms, Defensive Aggregators, and Super-Aggregators, 27 J. ECON. PERSP. 45, 45
(2013). Some intermediaries such as Avanci, however, offer fixed prices. See
AVANCI,
ACCELERATING
IOT
CONNECTIVITY
(2020),
https://www.avanci.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Avanci-White-Paper.pdf
(offering fixed prices as opposed to privately negotiating deals).
130. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PATENT ASSERTION ENTITY ACTIVITY: AN FTC
STUDY 1, (2016), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/patent-assertion-entity-activity-ftc-study/p131203_patent_assertion_entity_activity_an_ftc_study_0.pdf (“PAEs monetize their patents primarily through licensing negotiations with alleged infringers, infringement litigation, or both.”).
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the good to demand based on the market price. Technology
adopters are the sellers in the downstream market and they
choose the quantity of the good to supply based on the market
price. The assumption of perfect competition allows for a comparison to the Cournot model, which also assumes that the product market is perfectly competitive.131
The negotiation framework assumes that patent holders
take the downstream product market price as given. Patent
holders negotiate with adopters and choose royalties that are
contingent on the realization of the product market price.
Adopters and patent holders should have consistent perspectives
on the market price. If adopters take the product market price
as given, it is reasonable to believe that patent holders also take
the product market price as given. This contrasts with the
Cournot model in which adopters are price takers in the downstream market but patent holders are price setters in the downstream market. In the Cournot model, adopters choose royalties
with full knowledge of the effects of royalties on the downstream
market price.
Also, the perspectives of the negotiating parties should be
consistent over time. The negotiating parties should not be able
to anticipate the effects of royalties on the market price during
negotiations and later take the product market price as given.
This would require that adopters have knowledge about the effects of royalties on product prices during negotiation and then
forget these effects after negotiation when the product market
clears.
The negotiation framework allows the parties to choose the
form of royalty arrangements. Negotiated patent license agreements in practice involve many types of royalty arrangements
that are contingent on market outcomes. These arrangements
can involve profit shares, equity, and options.132 Varner finds
131. The analysis can be extended to allow for imperfect competition in the
downstream product market but that is beyond the present discussion.
132. See Nicos Savva & Niyazi Taneri, The Role of Equity, Royalty, and
Fixed Fees in Technology Licensing to University Spin-Offs, 61(6) MGMT. SCI.
1323, 1324 (2015) (“[I]t is optimal for [a university Technology Transfer Office
(TTO)] to offer contracts that include royalties alongside equity.”); Pascale
Crama, Bert De Reyck & Niyazi Taneri, Licensing Contracts: Control Rights,
Options, and Timing, 63(4) MGMT. SCI. 1131, 1145 (2017) (demonstrating “how
control rights, options, and timing can be used, in conjunction with various payment terms, to address the inefficiencies that may occur when innovators and
marketers form partnerships to develop and market new products.”).
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that patent licenses includes various contingent arrangements:
“joint venture agreements, product bundling or re-branding
agreements, distribution agreements, settlement agreements,
manufacturing and supply agreements, employment agreements, and acquisition agreements.”133 Varner finds elsewhere
that when patent license agreements involve running royalties,
90% are contingent on sales revenue rather than units of output
sold.134 Elfenbein observes that royalties in university licensing
agreements involve payments contingent on sales, lump-sum license fees, milestones, maintenance fees and minimums, and equity.135 Finch finds that some biotechnology companies seek alliances and mergers and acquisitions in addition to negotiating
licenses.136
In the market for patent licenses, as in many other markets,
the parties are involved in many bilateral negotiations. Technology adopters negotiate with multiple patent holders and patent
holders negotiate with multiple technology adopters.137 Those bilateral negotiations are inevitably interdependent because one
party’s returns from one agreement can affect that party’s

133. Thomas R. Varner, An Economic Perspective on Patent Licensing Structure and Provisions, 46 BUS. ECON. 229, 230 (2011) (referencing analysis results
from his previous paper in 2010) [hereinafter Varner, Patent Licensing]. See
generally Thomas R. Varner, Technology Royalty Rates in SEC Filings, 45
NOUVELLES 120, 120–27 (2010) (presenting results from analysis of technology
licenses containing various types of agreements) [hereinafter Varner, Royalty
Rates].
134. Varner, Royalty Rates, supra note 133, at 233.
135. See Daniel W. Elfenbein, Contract Structure and Performance of University-Industry
Technology
Transfer
Agreements
11
(July
30,
2009), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1452717 (listing the five subcategories of payment provisions that are common in contracts for university technology licensing agreements); see also Deepak Hegde, Tacit Knowledge and the Structure of
License Contracts: Evidence from the Biomedical Industry, 23 J. ECON. & MGMT.
STRATEGY 568 (2014) (comparing the characteristics that make up biomedical
license agreement contracts between inventors and developers); Richard Jensen
& Marie Thursby, Proofs and Prototypes for Sale: The Licensing of University
Inventions, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 240 (2001) (exploring the parameters that comprise university licensing agreements, and arguing that without an economic
incentive for the inventor, sponsored research alone is insufficient to foster development).
136. Sharon Finch, Royalty Rates: Current Issues and Trends, 7 J. COM. BIOTECH. 224, 230 (2001).
137. See Sidak, supra note 126, at 985.
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returns from other agreements.138 In practice, individuals typically enter into many contracts simultaneously, such as those
with employers, insurance companies, and service providers.
Firms simultaneously engage in many contracts with employees,
customers, suppliers, and partners.139 This is why the firm in
general has been characterized as a “nexus for contracting relationships.”140
Negotiation has been studied extensively by economists. An
important approach characterizes the outcomes of bargaining
based on a set of desirable properties stated as axioms. John
Nash set forth a set of basic axioms that should be satisfied by
bargaining between two parties.141 The Nash bargaining solution is the unique outcome that satisfies those axioms.142 The
Nash bargaining solution involves equal division of the gains
from trade for the two parties.143 Nash’s characterization of bargaining extends readily to allow different relative bargaining
powers of the two parties.144 Then, the outcome of bargaining is
a unique solution that specifies different shares of the net benefits from exchange.145 The negotiation framework presented here
allows asymmetric bargaining power.
138. See generally Spulber, supra note 41; Daniel F. Spulber, Patent Licensing and Bargaining with Innovative Complements and Substitutes, 70 RES.
ECON. 693 (2016) [hereinafter Spulber, Patent Licensing].
139. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305,
310 (1976).
140. Id. at 311.
141. John F. Nash, Jr., The Bargaining Problem, 18 ECONOMETRICA 155,
155–62 (1950) [hereinafter Nash, Bargaining Problem]; John F. Nash, Jr., TwoPerson Cooperative Games, 21 ECONOMETRICA 128, 136–40 (1953) [hereinafter
Nash, Cooperative Games].
142. Nash, Cooperative Games, supra note 141, at 129.
143. Nash, Bargaining Problem, supra note 141, at 155.
144. See Ken Binmore, Ariel Rubinstein, & Asher Wolinsky, The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling, 17 RAND J. ECON. 176, 186 (1986)
(“Modellers [sic] often use the asymmetric Nash solution in an attempt to capture some imprecisely defined differences in ‘bargaining power,’ where a large
exponent α is interpreted as representing a relatively high bargaining power of
party 1.”).
145. Id. at 177 (“A unique perfect equilibrium outcome of such a game is
then viewed as the solution to the bargaining situation studied.”); Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining,
53 ECONOMETRICA 1133, 1149 (1985) (“In their models when two agents meet
they agree immediately on an equal division of the difference between the unit
and the sum of their reservation values. That is, they adopt Nash’s bargaining
solution.”); Ariel Rubinstein, Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model, 50
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The negotiation framework presented here applies an important approach known as Nash-in-Nash bargaining.146 Nashin-Nash bargaining is useful for examining simultaneous bargaining among multiple bargaining pairs.147 With Nash-in-Nash
bargaining, each bargaining pair takes the equilibrium outcomes of other bargaining pairs as given.148 The outcome of bargaining for a particular bargaining pair is a “best response” to
the outcomes of bargaining for other pairs of market participants.149 This approach has been extended and applied in a variety of settings such as industry labor negotiations.150
The negotiation framework characterizes multiple patent licensing agreements. Based on Nash-in-Nash bargaining, each
patent holder and adopter pair takes as given the equilibrium
ECONOMETRICA 97, 100 (1982) (describing bargaining in terms of “the partition
of a pie”).
146. Harsanyi extends the Nash bargaining framework to consider simultaneous Nash bargaining between many pairs of economic agents. In Harsanyi’s
analysis, the negotiated agreements between pairs of economic agents are interrelated. The final outcome depends on what each pair of economic agents can
obtain in various groupings of agents and what groups of economic agents can
obtain in the set of bilateral agreements. John C. Harsanyi, A Bargaining Model
for the Cooperative n-Person Game, in CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE THEORY OF
GAMES IV, 40 ANNALS OF MATHEMATICAL STUDIES, 325 (A. W. Tucker & R. D.
Luce, eds., Princeton Univ. Press 1963); John C. Harsanyi, A Simplified Bargaining Model for the n-Person Cooperative Game, 4 INT’L ECON. REV. 194
(1963); John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, A Generalized Nash Solution for
Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information, 18 MGMT. SCI. 80
(1972).
147. This combines the Nash bargaining solution with the non-cooperative
Nash equilibrium. The non-cooperative Nash equilibrium is a game theory concept in which individual players take the equilibrium moves of other players as
given when formulating their strategies. John Nash, Non-Cooperative Games,
54 ANNALS MATHEMATICS 286, 287 (1951).
148. Allan Collard-Wexler, Gautam Gowrisankaran & Robin S. Lee, Nashin-Nash Bargaining: A Microfoundation for Applied Work, 127 J. POL. ECON.
163, 165 (2019).
149. Id. at 184.
150. Horn and Wolinsky further develop the Nash-in-Nash bargaining
framework. Henrick Horn & Asher Wolinsky, Bilateral Monopolies and Incentives for Merger, 19 RAND J. ECON. 408 (1988). For an overview of applications
and extension of the Nash-in-Nash bargaining framework to allow strategic interaction over time with repeated counter offers, see Allan Collard-Wexler, Gautam Gowrisankaran & Robin S. Lee, Nash-in-Nash Bargaining: A Microfoundation for Applied Work, 127 J. POL. ECON. 163 (2019). For a study on Nash-inNash bargaining in comparison to the Cournot complementary monopolies
model, see Spulber, supra note 41. Nash-in-Nash bargaining can also be considered with patent licensing when inventions can be imperfect complements or
substitutes. Spulber, Patent Licensing, supra note 138.
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royalties for other patent holder and adopter pairs. Negotiation
results in a division of each adopter’s profit from applying the
patented inventions net of the value of the best alternative. This
approach is not restrictive, because similar results would hold
for almost any bargaining model. Most bargaining models imply
sharing of benefits among multiple players.
The negotiation framework has the following features. Consider an industry in which there are N patent holders and M
technology adopters. Both patent holders and adopters take the
product market price p as given so that negotiation is contingent
on the market price. To simplify the discussion, suppose that
adopters have the same production cost function C(q) where q is
an adopter’s output. The framework can be extended to allow for
cost differences among adopters.
The cost function is such that marginal costs are increasing
in output.151 So, each adopter has an upward-sloping supply
curve. This rules out the extreme assumption of an infinite elasticity of supply for technology adopters that is assumed in the
Cournot model. An upward sloping supply function means that
royalties are passed through to final prices at any rate that is
greater than zero and less than 100%.
The N inventions are perfect complements and an adopter
must apply all of the inventions to operate in the market. Patent
holders and adopters negotiate bilaterally over royalties. Each
patent holder and adopter pair negotiates a per-unit royalty and
a lump-sum royalty. So, each patent holder indexed by i from 1
to N has revenue per adopter equal to a running royalty multiplied by output riq and a lump-sum royalty Ri. Because adopters
are price takers, each adopter chooses the profit-maximizing output q that equates marginal cost to the market price net of total
per-unit royalties. The adopter’s supply function depends on the
price net of total per-unit royalties.152

151. Each adopter’s marginal cost function C′(q) is increasing in q. If the
market price is p, the profit maximizing output is such that marginal cost
equals price, C′(q) = p. This gives the supply function q = S(p). The supply function S is the inverse of its marginal cost function so the supply function is increasing in the price.
152. The profit maximizing output of a producer sets marginal cost equal to
the price net of total per-unit royalties, 𝑝 − ∑𝑁
𝑖=1 𝑟𝑖 = 𝐶′(𝑞). This can be rewritten
as the traditional supply function, which depends on the price net of per-unit
royalties. 𝑞 = 𝑆(𝑝 − ∑𝑁
𝑖=1 𝑟𝑖 ).
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Each adopter’s benefit V from the patent license agreements
equals revenue minus production costs and minus patent license
royalties.153 If the adopter does not obtain licenses from all of the
patent holders, the adopter must pursue an alternative opportunity. The value of the best alternative opportunity is v, which
is the disagreement payoff for the adopter in bilateral bargaining. The adopter’s net benefit from patent licensing is V – v.
To simplify the discussion, every patent holder has the same
bargaining power relative to each adopter. Let A be the relative
bargaining power of a patent holder. The patent holder’s relative
bargaining power is a factor that can take any value that is
greater than zero and less than 100%. The patent holder’s disagreement payoff is zero for each bilateral negotiation. If the patent holder does not form a patent license agreement with a particular adopter, then the patent holder obtains no royalties from
that adopter. The analysis would still apply if there was a disagreement payoff such as damages for infringement.
The patent holder and adopter choose royalties to maximize
their joint benefits and also to divide the joint benefits.154 The
negotiation framework generates the important conclusion that
any patent holder and adopter pair will rely exclusively on a
lump-sum royalty. The negotiating parties will not use a perunit royalty because it would distort the adopter’s profit-maximizing output decision. The per-unit royalty is an inefficient way
of dividing profit. Because negotiation divides profit between the
parties, they both want the adopter to maximize profit.155
The per-unit royalty transfers some profit from the adopter
to the patent holder but decreases profit in the process. To avoid
the joint loss from decreasing profit, the patent holder and an
adopter do not have a per-unit royalty. To illustrate this, suppose that there is only one patent holder and one adopter. A royalty per unit of output would decrease the adopter’s output.156 If
𝑁
153. This can be written as follows, V = 𝑝𝑞 − 𝐶(𝑞) − ∑𝑁
𝑖=1 𝑟𝑖 𝑞 − ∑𝑖=1 𝑅𝑖 .
154. The standard Nash bargaining outcome maximizes the product of net
benefits with exponents equal to relative bargaining power, that is,
(V
– v)1 – A(riq + Ri)A.
155. The bargaining pair chooses an outcome such that one party cannot be
made better off without making the other party worse off. This efficiency criterion, known as Pareto optimality, is a standard property of economic models of
bargaining.
156. To illustrate this, consider the effect of a per-unit royalty on profit excluding royalties, which is given by pS(p – r) – C(S(p – r)). The supply function
equates the net price to marginal cost, p – r = C′(S(p – r)). So, the effect of an
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there were a royalty r per unit of output, an adopter’s supply
function would be increasing in the market price net of the perunit royalty. Because the supply curve is upward sloping, the
profit maximizing adopter would choose a lower output S(p – r)
in response to the imposition of the per-unit royalty. Without a
per-unit royalty, the supply of output S(p) maximizes profit pq –
C(q), so that output corresponds to the supply S(p). Royalty payments aside, the lower output due to a per-unit royalty decreases
the adopter’s profit in comparison to the profit-maximizing output. So, the bargaining pair would choose a zero per unit royalty.
This argument holds with multiple patent license agreements.
None of the bargaining pairs will choose a per-unit royalty.
The negotiation framework establishes that the parties
choose a lump-sum royalty that is a share of the adopter’s profit
net of the value of the best alternative. Negotiation equalizes the
net benefits of the patent holder and technology adopter
weighted by relative bargaining powers.157 Because there are no
per-unit royalties, the adopter’s output choice depends only on
the market price.158 The adopter’s profit net of the value of the
best alternative is contingent on the product market price and
equals pS(p) – C(S(p)) – v. The share of net profit depends on the
patent holder’s relative bargaining power and the number of patent holders, A/(1 – A + AN). Because the adopter’s profit is increasing in the market price, the royalty is increasing in the
market price. The royalty is increasing in the patent holder’s
bargaining power, decreasing in the value of the best alternative
opportunity, and decreasing in the number of patent holders.159

increase in the per-unit royalty is [p – C′(S(p – r))]S′(p – r) = – r S′(p – r)). This
is less than zero because the supply curve is upward sloping. So, a royalty lowers profit excluding royalties. Put differently, profit pS(p – r) – C(S(p – r)) is less
than pS(p) – C(S(p)).
157. The standard bargaining solution equalizes the net benefits of the parties weighted by their relative bargaining powers, A(V – v) = (1 – A)(riq + Ri).
158. Because lump-sum royalties are equal, the bargaining can be written
as A(pq – C(q) – NR – v) = (1 – A)R. Solving for the royalty gives R = [A/(1 – A
+ AN)](pq – C(q) – v). The output is given by the adopter’s supply decision, q =
S(p).
159. The product market demand function is D(p) so that the market-clearing price equates market demand to total supply, D(p) = MS(p). The market
clearing price does not depend on the number of patent holders, the allocation
of bargaining power, or royalties. Each adopter has a benefit V that corresponds
to profit minus royalties pq – C(q) – NR. So, the adopter’s profit minus royalties
is a weighted average of profit and the value of the best alternative opportunity,
V = [(1 – A)/(1 – A + AN)](pq – C(q)) + [NA/(1 – A + AN)]v.
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The negotiation framework gives royalties that are contingent on the realization of the market price. The negotiated outcome is consistent with a variety of royalty arrangements including royalties that are a share of the product price or product
revenues. The negotiated outcome also is consistent with combinations of equity arrangements, up-front payments, milestones,
and various other contingent arrangements. The negotiated outcome is consistent with royalty arrangements that adjust to variations in product market prices.
Because royalties are a share of the adopter’s profit net of
the value of the best alternative, it follows that the interests of
each patent owner and adopter pair are aligned. All of the patent
holders licensing to a particular adopter prefer that the adopter
maximize profit. An adopter can bargain with each of the patent
holders, and all the licensing agreements will be consistent with
each other. The adopter chooses output to maximize profit by
equating marginal cost to the market price. Because there are
no royalties per unit of output, the problem of multiple-marginalization does not arise.
The negotiation framework provides insights into antitrust
policy debates. The royalties that a monopolist offering a bundle
of the complementary inventions would choose provides an important benchmark. For consistency with negotiation, the bundling monopolist takes product market prices as given. The outcome with negotiation and the outcome with a bundling
monopolist are comparable. If the bundling monopolist were to
exercise market power downstream in addition to its market
power in the market for patent licenses, it would obtain even
greater royalties and earn more revenues.
The bundling monopolist can choose a combination consisting of a royalty rM per-unit of output and a lump-sum royalty RM
for the bundle of patents. As was the case with negotiation, the
bundling monopolist wishes to choose the per-unit royalty such
that the adopter has the greatest profit. As before, each producer’s supply curve is upward sloping so that a per-unit royalty
would distort the outcome by decreasing the producer’s output.
The adopter’s profit is decreasing in the per-unit royalty so that
the bundling monopolist chooses a zero per-unit royalty. As was
observed with negotiation, the bundling monopolist avoids using
a per-unit royalty so that the adopter chooses the output that
maximizes profit. The bundling monopolist then chooses
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royalties to capture economic rents without diminishing adopter
profit.
The bundling monopolist increases the lump-sum royalty to
the level at which an adopter is indifferent between adopting the
complementary inventions and choosing the best alternative.
The bundling monopolist chooses a lump-sum royalty equal to
the adopter’s profit net of the adopter’s value of the best alternative. The bundling monopolist chooses a lump-sum royalty RM
equal to the adopter’s profit contingent on the market price net
of the value of the best alternative, pS(p) – C(S(p)) – v.
The discussion establishes that total royalties with bilateral
negotiation are strictly less than royalties with a bundling monopolist, NR < RM. This outcome is the reverse of the “Cournot
Effect.” The bundling monopolist chooses greater royalties than
the total with negotiation for any rate of cost pass-though less
than 100%, that is, for any individual adopter supply curve with
a positive slope. The bundling monopolist chooses greater royalties than the total with negotiation for any patent holder bargaining power that is less than 100%. This conclusion holds for
any number of patent holders and for any value of the best alternative opportunity. The royalties the bundling monopolist
chooses correspond to a limiting case of the negotiated outcome.
The bundling monopolist’s royalties corresponds to the limit of
the total negotiated royalties when the relevant bargaining
power of each inventor approaches 100%, that is, when A approaches the limit of 1.
The negotiation framework presented here has additional
implications for the economic and legal analysis of patent pools.
The standard economic model characterizes patent pools as bundling monopolists.160 In practice, however, technology adopters
and patent holders may have the option of negotiating contracts.
This suggests that patent pool royalties will not exceed negotiated prices. So, patent pools with this option will have total royalties less than or equal to the negotiated outcome. This implies
that market negotiation of patent license agreements provides
an important benchmark for patent pools. The negotiation
framework presented here then implies that patent pools will
have total royalties substantially lower than a bundling monopolist patent holder. The bundling monopolist is not an accurate

160. See, e.g., Spulber, supra note 41, at 36–38; Spulber, Patent Licensing,
supra note 138, at 707–08.
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description of patent pools. This suggests that patent pools serve
economic functions that differ from regulating royalties. Under
some market conditions, patent pools serve to mitigate transaction costs and improve coordination among patent holders and
technology adopters.
C. ANTITRUST POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF NEGOTIATION
The negotiation framework establishes that complementary
inventions should not raise antitrust concerns. The parties do
not rely exclusively on distortionary running royalties. Patent
holders do not commit to take-it-or-leave-it royalty offers. Both
patent holders and technology adopters have bargaining power.
Cost pass-through is not 100%. The negotiated outcome avoids
multiple marginalizations so that the competitive downstream
product market will be efficient. Royalty arrangements are contingent on the downstream market price so that they adjust to
market conditions. Total royalties with negotiation are less than
those of a bundling monopolist.
Negotiation of patent license agreements reverses the influential “Cournot Effect.” The observation that total royalties with
negotiation are strictly less than those of a bundling monopolist
(NR < RM) has a number of important implications. Negotiation
eliminates the basis for predictions of “royalty stacking,” “SEP
hold-up,” “patent thickets,” “blocking patents,” the “Tragedy of
the Anti-Commons,” and the promotion of “regulatory patent
pools.” In short, negotiation removes the branches from the
Cournot tree.
The negotiation framework is comparable to the Cournot
model as applied to patent licensing. Both approaches involve
multiple patent holders and multiple producers that are technology adopters. Adopters choose to license patents rather than infringing. The inventions are strict complements, so adopters
must license all of the patents to engage in production and supply final products. A patent holder’s entire portfolio of patents
might contain many different types of technologies and inventions.161 The downstream market is perfectly competitive with
161. For ease of discussion, suppose that patent owners do not have any licensing costs and also do not have any opportunity cost from licensing. The
analysis of negotiation can readily incorporate these costs. Because all inventions are strict complements to each other, it is not possible to identify the contribution of individual inventions. All of the inventions are necessary for the
final product and may be considered symmetrically as a consequence. There are
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price-taking producers. Each producer’s profit equals revenues
minus production costs. Each producer’s net benefit from adopting the inventions is profit minus total royalties paid to patent
holders and minus the value of the best alternative.
Antitrust policy should not presume that there is a competition problem in industries with complementary inventions. Antitrust policy does not need to apply extra scrutiny to industries
with technology standards and SEPs. Competitive markets with
negotiation of patent license agreements are sufficient to provide
the coordination needed for complex innovation. Antitrust policy
makers should avoid following an overly simplistic “Standards,
Conduct, Performance” paradigm.162 Technology standards in
themselves do not imply that there are problems with either
competitive conduct or economic performance.
As noted previously, many patent pools provide patent holders and technology adopters the option of directly negotiating
patent licenses. Even if this option is not exercised, the potential
for market negotiation of patent license agreements limits patent pool royalties. The negotiation framework demonstrates
that patent pools should not be characterized as bundling monopolists. This implies that the purpose of the patent pool is not
to generate excessive revenues through bundling complementary inventions.
The negotiation framework suggests that antitrust policy
markets should not promote patent pools as a means for controlling total royalties for complementary inventions. Antitrust policy should continue to emphasize the beneficial role of patent
pools as mechanisms for mitigating transaction costs and improving coordination. Antitrust policy makers should maintain
neutrality, allowing markets to determine the best mix of patent
pools, intermediaries, and bilateral negotiation.
The antitrust policy implications of the negotiation framework are robust to very different market conditions. The results
of the analysis continue to apply for any cost pass-through rate
ranging from very small to very large percentages. Put differently, the analysis allows for any producer supply curves that
no other differences between the inventors in terms of patent validity or licensing costs. This means that the inventions can be viewed as symmetric and total
royalties will be the same for every invention.
162. Daniel F. Spulber, Innovation Economics: Technology Standards, Competitive Conduct and Economic Performance, 9 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 777, 778–
79 (2013).
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are not infinitely elastic. The analysis also continues to apply for
any patent holder bargaining power ranging from very low to
very high. The analysis applies for general demand conditions in
the downstream market. Finally, the negotiation framework
holds for any numbers of patent holders and producers.
The perfect complements assumption is a “worst-case scenario.” The perfect complements assumption is standard in discussions of antitrust policy.163 Inventions are perfect complements if a particular set of technologies must be used in
combination to create a specific complex innovation.164 This also
could occur because the technologies are SEPs declared to SSOs
that are necessary for producers to implement a technology
standard. The main conclusions apply if the inventions are substitutes or imperfect complements, as long as the benefits of using all of the inventions exceed the benefits of using only some
of the inventions. This is because negotiation between patent
holders and technology adopters will choose the optimal mix of
inventions. If only some of the inventions are needed to create
complex innovations or to comply with standards, the results apply to negotiation between active patent holders and technology
adopters. Also, if there is competition between substitute inventions, this will constrain royalties. The conclusions also extend
to heterogeneous inventions with each combination of inventions
having different effects on the adopter’s profit.165
The antitrust implications of the negotiation framework
presented here extend to other competitive environments. The
results still apply if downstream producers engage in imperfect
competition, and patent holders and producers negotiate over total royalty payments. When royalties are a share of profits, producers that engage in imperfect competition will continue to
maximize their profits. This is because producers that retain a
share of profits have the same incentives to maximize profits.

163. See, e.g., Spulber, Patent Licensing, supra note 138, at 706.
164. COURNOT, supra note 26, at 100–03; see also Spulber, supra note 41
(applying perfect complementary models in the downstream market); Spulber,
Patent Licensing, supra note 138, at 706 (applying perfect complementary models in intellectual property rights).
165. See Spulber, Patent Licensing, supra note 138, at 696–97.
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This observation holds for practically any economic model of monopolistic competition.166
Negotiation of patent license agreements may be inefficient
under some conditions. These conditions are not relevant to the
present analysis because they would risk violating antitrust policy. The market equilibrium can be distorted when downstream
producers engage in imperfect competition and upstream patent
holders are able to choose royalties and other restrictive contract
terms that increase prices downstream. Such distortions could
foster collusion among downstream producers and generate
higher total royalties. This problem is not unique to patents and
would apply to any type of vertical restraints involving productive inputs.
Patent license agreements that create anticompetitive horizontal or vertical restraints would be ruled out by antitrust policy. The Antitrust Guidelines state “[t]he Agencies apply the
same general antitrust principles to conduct involving intellectual property that they apply to conduct involving any other
form of property.”167 The Antitrust Guidelines caution that
[a] restraint in a licensing arrangement may harm such competition,
for example, if it facilitates market division or price-fixing. In addition,
license restrictions with respect to one market may harm such competition in another market by anticompetitively foreclosing access to, or
significantly raising the price of, an important input, or by facilitating
coordination to increase price or reduce output.168

In particular, the guidelines state “[l]icensing arrangements
raise concerns under the antitrust laws if they are likely to affect
adversely the prices, quantities, qualities, or varieties of goods
and services either currently or potentially available.”169
III. THE “COURNOT EFFECT” AND PATENT LICENSE
AGREEMENTS
This section summarizes the Cournot model and examines
its application to patent licensing. The Cournot model predicts
that complementary monopolists will choose input prices greater

166. See Daniel F. Spulber, Standard Setting Organisations and Standard
Essential Patents: Voting and Markets, 129 ECON. J. 1477, 1480 (2018)
https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12606.
167. ANTITRUST GUIDELINES, supra note 4, at 3.
168. Id. at 8.
169. Id.
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than the price that a bundling monopolist would choose.170 Applied to patents, the “Cournot Effect” predicts that the total of
per-unit royalties chosen by patent holders is greater than what
a bundling monopolist patent holder would choose.171 This section explains why the Cournot model should not apply to patent
licensing. The section reviews standard discussions of antitrust
policy toward complementary inventions based on the “Cournot
Effect.”
A. THE COURNOT MODEL AND THE “COURNOT EFFECT”
The Cournot model examines two upstream monopolists
that supply complementary inputs to downstream producers.
One complementary monopolist supplies copper and the other
supplies zinc. The two input monopolists sell to downstream producers of brass. The Cournot model assumes that the two inputs
must be used in fixed proportions to produce a unit of the final
output. Output cannot be produced without using a particular
mix of the inputs, so that the inputs are said to be perfect complements in production.172
Producers of brass have constant unit costs and infinite elasticity of supply. The final product price in the Cournot model
equals the per-unit prices of the two inputs, copper and zinc, plus
any other unit costs of producing brass. As a consequence, a $1
increase in the price of copper or the price of zinc or the sum of
input prices results in a $1 increase in the price of brass.173
In the Cournot model, input suppliers make take-it-orleave-it price offers to the downstream producers.174 Input suppliers choose their price offers “non-cooperatively.”175 This
means that the input suppliers make independent price offers

170. Fritz Machlup & Martha Taber, Bilateral Monopoly, Successive Monopoly, and Vertical Integration, 27 ECONOMICA 101, 103–04 (1960).
171. Spulber, Patent Licensing, supra note 138, at 706–07.
172. COURNOT, supra note 26, at 100–03; see also Machlup & Taber, supra
note 170 (surveying the historical literature on Cournot’s work).
173. The Cournot complementary monopolies model is as follows. The perunit prices are r1 for copper and r2 for zinc. Any other per-unit costs of production are constant and equal c. The equilibrium is obtained as follows. The market demand for brass is Q = D(P), where Q is the total market output of brass
and P is the price of brass. The elasticity of supply is infinite so that the final
output price is P = r1 + r2 + c. This is the horizontal industry supply curve that
generates 100% cost pass-through. COURNOT, supra note 26, at 100–03.
174. Id. at 99.
175. Id.
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without knowledge of the negative effects of their price offers on
other input suppliers. An input supplier makes a price offer that
is a profit-maximizing best response to what each supplier believes will be the offer of the other producer.
The Cournot model assumes that the downstream market
for brass is perfectly competitive. Implicitly, there are many
small downstream producers of brass. Those producers take the
market price of brass as a given and do not believe that their
output could affect the price of output. The small downstream
producers also take the prices of the two inputs as given. The
producers do not believe that their input demand could affect the
prices of either of the two inputs. Downstream producers have
constant unit costs of production so that they have an infinite
elasticity of supply. The market price of the downstream output
exactly equals the total of the input prices plus any other unit
costs of producers.
The input suppliers face a “free rider” problem because they
do not coordinate their “take-it-or-leave-it” price offers. A complementary input monopolist does not recognize that an increase
in its input price will lower the revenues of the other input monopolist. Both increase their prices such that the total is greater
than what they would choose by coordinating their actions. This
implies that the total of prices is greater than what a bundling
monopolist would choose. The input monopolists do not attain
the joint profit maximum. “[T]he composite commodity will always be made more expensive, by reason of separation of interests than by reason of the fusion of monopolies.”176
The Cournot model suffers from an inconsistency in its assumptions. Downstream producers take the product price as
given but upstream input suppliers do not. Upstream input suppliers are able to affect the downstream product price by controlling input prices. It seems unlikely that input suppliers have
market power in product markets when producers have no market power in product markets.

176. Id. at 103 observing, “An association of monopolists, working for their
own interest, in this instance will also work for the interest of consumers, which
is exactly the opposite of what happens with competing producers.” Id.
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B. THE COURNOT MODEL AND PATENT LICENSE AGREEMENTS
Antitrust policy recommendations in economics and law often are based on the Cournot model.177 Such antitrust policy prescriptions illustrate the fallacy of overgeneralization or jumping
to conclusions.178 The hypothetical inefficiencies in Cournot’s
model of complementary monopolies do not imply that complementarities always have such effects.179 The special conditions
set forth in Cournot’s complementary monopolies model do not
apply to patents. Under more realistic assumptions about market conditions, complementary patents do not cause the
“Cournot Effect.”
Economic and legal studies that apply the Cournot model to
patent licensing make a number of assumptions that do not conform to institutions in the market for patent licenses. These assumptions are contrary to negotiation of patent license agreements between patent holders and technology adopters.
Applications of the Cournot model to patents assume that
patent holders are price makers, offering royalties using “takeit-or-leave-it” pricing, and technology adopters are price takers.180 Patent holders are able to exercise indirect market power
in a vertically distinct market. Patent holders have all market
power in upstream technology markets and technology adopters
have no countervailing market power. There are no viable substitute technologies that could compete with the complementary
technologies. Technology adopters do not add value because they
do not provide their own assets, capabilities, or technologies.
177. Herbert Hovenkamp, Harvard, Chicago, and Transaction Cost Economics in Antitrust Analysis, 55 ANTITRUST BULL. 613, 635 (2010) (“Double marginalization problems occur in both vertically related markets and markets for
complements. The latter the situation is sometimes referred to as the ‘Cournot
complements’ problem, but the fundamental analysis is the same.”).
178. See PATRICK J. HURLEY, A CONCISE INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC (10th ed.
2007). See generally Hans Hansen, Fallacies, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (Edward Zalta ed., 2019), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/
fall2019/entries/fallacies/ (explaining fallacies generally).
179. The “Cournot Effect” fallacy is not a criticism of Cournot’s complementary monopolies model, but rather of its application in situations with different
conditions.
180. Saul H. Hymans, The Price-Taker: Uncertainty, Utility, and the Supply
Function,7 INT’L ECON. REV. 346, 347 (1966) (describing a firm that accepts a
given price as a “price-taker”); John Riley & Richard Zeckhauser, Optimal Selling Strategies: When to Haggle, When to Hold Firm, 98 Q. J. ECON. 267, 267
(1983) (“A seller encountering risk-neutral buyers one at a time should, if commitments are feasible, quote a single take-it-or-leave-it price to each.”).
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Patent holders control the final product price and producers
have no control over the final product price.
Applications of the Cournot model to patent licensing are
extensions of Arrow’s classic model.181 In Arrow’s framework, a
monopoly inventor offers licenses to a competitive product market in which producers have an infinite elasticity of supply.182
The monopoly inventor chooses a running royalty that is constant per unit of output.183 The monopoly inventor chooses the
per-unit royalty such that the equilibrium in the product market
corresponds to a product market monopoly.184 This analysis implies that patent royalties generate the standard deadweight
welfare loss due to monopoly. Nordhaus applies Arrow’s model
to the question of what should be the optimal patent life.185 Because royalties are distortionary, Nordhaus concludes that patent life should be just long enough to cover the costs of research
and development.186
The Cournot approach misses the complexities involved in
transferring and adopting technologies. Because the Cournot
model simply involves price announcements, it follows that applications of the Cournot model to patent licensing assume that
technology transfers are spot market transactions rather than
contractual transactions. The spot market approach to patent licensing fails to recognize that technology transfers and adoption
unfold over time. The spot market approach misses the complexity of contracting for technology transfers. Unlike basic productive inputs, technology transfers often are bundled with
knowledge transfers and complementary goods and services.
Bundling of knowledge, goods, and services requires contractual
agreements.
The Cournot model, as applied to patents, represents technology transfers as basic inputs such as copper and zinc, which
181. Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources
for Invention, in NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RES., THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF
INVENTIVE ACTIVITY 609 (Princeton Univ. Press ed. 1962).
182. Id. at 619–22.
183. Id. at 619.
184. Id.
185. See WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH, AND WELFARE: A
THEORETICAL TREATMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE (1969) [hereinafter
NORDHAUS, TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE]; see also William D. Nordhaus, The Optimum Life of a Patent: Reply, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 3, 428–31 (1972) [hereinafter
Nordhaus, Patent Life].
186. Nordhaus, Patent Life supra note 185, at 430–31.
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are divisible and depletable.187 Producers use up these inputs in
producing brass.188 According to this view, patent holders provide access to technology in return for royalties that are constant
per unit of output.189 Unlike such basic inputs, however, technology transfers are indivisible and non-rivalrous. There is no need
for metered pricing to ration usage.
An anomaly in applications of the Cournot model to patent
licensing is that input prices and royalties apply to very different
things. In the Cournot model, input prices are based on the number of units of those inputs, e.g. the weight of copper and of
zinc.190 When applying the Cournot model to patent licensing applications, royalties are based on the number of units of output
of producers using the patents. This would be equivalent to pricing copper and zinc based on the weight of brass. When the relationship of inputs to outputs can vary, as in the relationship between patents as inputs and output of products, the Cournot
approach will be misleading.
Applications of the Cournot model to patent licensing restrict royalties to running royalties that are constant per unit of
output.191 Such royalties can cause price distortions from double
marginalization and deadweight welfare losses.192 Restricting
royalties to constant charges per unit of output overstates the
effects of royalties on product prices. So, royalties that are constant per unit of output overstate the effects of complementary
inventions on product prices. Relying only on such royalties
means that all economic transfers from technology adopters to
patent holders are distortionary. In contrast, lump-sum royalties and various revenue and profit-sharing royalty arrangements mitigate or avoid such distortionary effects.
Applications of the Cournot model to patent licensing typically do not consider the complexities of patent license

187. See, e.g., COURNOT supra note 26, at 100 (using copper and zinc as inputs).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Spulber, supra note 44, at 678 (“If running royalties are specific, running royalties consist of a royalty r multiplied by the number of units sold Q.”)
192. See, e.g., id. (stating that using lump-sum royalties instead would be a
way to avoid the “distortionary effects of double marginalization” caused by running royalties).
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agreements.193 Running royalties that are constant per unit of
output do not adjust to changes in output prices and revenues.
This approach ignores the many types of contingent royalty arrangements such a profit sharing. Contingent royalty arrangements offer risk sharing to patent holders and technology
adopters.194 Contingent royalties serve to provide incentives for
performance and sharing of information that addresses moral
hazard and adverse selection problems.195
The Cournot model assumes that patent holders have all
market power in downstream product markets.196 Technology
adopters and final customers have no market power in downstream product markets. Input suppliers to downstream producers have no market power. Downstream products are homogeneous so that there are no substitute products in downstream
product markets.197 Simply by choosing patent royalties, patent
holders fully control prices in downstream product markets. Finally, patent holders behave non-cooperatively and free-rider effects generate distortions in total royalties.198

193. See, e.g., Spulber, supra note 44, at 696 (observing that the “Cournot
Effect” does not apply to patent license agreements).
194. See generally Hayne E. Leland, Optimal Risk Sharing and the Leasing
of Natural Resources, with Applications to Oil and Gas Leasing on the OCS, 92
Q. J. ECON. 413 (1978) (modeling royalty payments as risk-sharing between parties to a transaction).
195. Richard Jensen & Marie Thursby, Proofs and Prototypes for Sale: The
Licensing of University Inventions, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 240, 241 (2001) (“A lumpsum payment provides no incentive for the inventor to expend further effort in
development . . . royalties solve this moral-hazard problem by linking the inventor’s license income to additional effort.”); Emmanuel Dechenaux, Jerry
Thursby, & Marie Thursby, Inventor Moral Hazard in University Licensing: The
Role of Contracts, 40 RES. POL’Y 94, 94 (2011) (“[T]o the extent that faculty inventors prefer to solve new puzzles rather than develop existing inventions, obtaining cooperation requires financial incentives tied to development.”); Daniela
Marinescu & Dumitru Marin, Optimal Licensing Contracts with Adverse Selection and Informational Rents, 6 THEORETICAL & APPLIED ECON. 27, 40–43
(2011) (analyzing how to optimize contingent-royalty contracts to best align incentives).
196. See generally Spulber, supra note 44, at 696 (discussing the assumption
that input monopolists, here patent holders, announce prices they will charge
to downstream producers).
197. COURNOT, supra note 26, at 100.
198. See, e.g., Spulber, supra note 44 at 696 (discussing one way to eliminate
the “free rider problem”).
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C. THE COURNOT MODEL AND COST PASS-THROUGH
The Cournot model assumes that individual producers have
constant unit costs consisting of production costs and per-unit
royalties.199 This means that producers have an infinite elasticity of supply and the aggregate supply function also is infinitely
elastic. The market price equals unit production costs plus total
per-unit royalties.200 This means that there is 100% passthrough of royalties to the final product price. Royalties are a
constant amount per unit of output so per unit royalties are
passed on fully to consumers of the final product.
In most markets, individual producers have upward sloping
supply curves.201 The rate of cost pass-through is between zero
and 100%, where a cost pass-through rate of less than one is said
to be incomplete and a cost pass-through rate equal to one is said
to be complete.202 In the basic competitive market model with
upward-sloping supply, the rate of cost pass-through is incomplete. The classic formula for cost pass-through in a competitive
market is 1/(1 + ED/ES), where ED is the elasticity of demand and
ES is the elasticity of supply.203 The Cournot model assumes that
the product market has a downward sloping demand so that the
elasticity of demand is positive.204 The Cournot model further
assumes that the product market supply is infinitely elastic—
that is, the supply curve is a horizontal line.205 With a positive
elasticity of demand and infinitely elastic supply, the cost passthrough rate is 100%.206 Any price responsiveness in supply—

199. See COURNOT, supra note 26 at 100.
200. Id.
201. Alexei Alexandrov & Sergei Koulayev, Using the Economics of the PassThrough in Proving Antitrust Injury in Robinson-Patman Cases, 60 ANTITRUST
BULL. 345 (2015).
202. See id. at 352 (showing that a cost pass-through of greater than 100%
is inconsistent with the terminology because it would indicate a greater price
reaction than the cost increase, while acknowledging that cost increases may
trigger various price increases); see also Alexei Alexandrov, Pass-Through Rates
in the Real World: The Effect of Price Points and Menu Costs, 79 ANTITRUST L.
J. 349 (2013).
203. See Henry Charles Fleeming Jenkin, On the Principles Which Regulate
the Incidence of Taxes, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY OF EDINBURGH
618, 631 (1871).
204. COURNOT, supra note 26, at 44–46.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 108.
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that is, an upward sloping supply curve—would decrease the
cost pass-through rate below 100%.207
The rate of cost pass-through generally is incomplete in
market models with imperfect competition.208 This can be illustrated by considering a downstream monopolist. The reasoning
is similar with imperfect competition downstream. If the downstream producer is a monopolist with constant unit costs, an increase in costs will generate a change in the price equal to the
ratio of the slope of the demand curve to the slope of the marginal
revenue curve.209 This is because a monopolist maximizes profit
by equating marginal revenue to marginal cost. Any increase in
cost will cause the monopolist to adjust their price to keep marginal revenue equal to cost, so the cost increase is passed
through to marginal revenue, but not to price. The monopolist’s
amount of cost pass-through is necessarily less than one, because the slope of the demand curve is greater than the slope of
the marginal revenue curve. The slope of the demand curve is
greater than that of the marginal revenue curve because average
revenue is greater than marginal revenue. Put differently, the
monopolist’s marginal revenue is always less than price because
selling one more unit requires lowering the price.
The extreme assumption of 100% cost pass-through does not
apply to most markets. Empirical studies demonstrate that costpass through tends to be very incomplete.210 As Bonnet et al. observe, “[a] large theoretical and growing empirical literature explains what could be contributing to incomplete retail price
transmission of upstream cost, shocks, or incomplete transmission of exchange rate shocks into countries’ domestic consumer

207. Id.
208. See Jeremy I. Bulow & Paul Pfleiderer, A Note on the Effect of Cost
Changes on Prices, 91 J. POL. ECON. 182–85 (1983); see also E.G. Weyl & M.
Fabinger, Pass-Through as an Economic Tool: Principles of Incidence Under Imperfect Competition, 121 J. POL. ECON. 528 (2013).
209. Bulow & Pfleiderer, supra note 208, at 183 (explaining that “for a given
increase in marginal cost, the monopolist will contract output so that marginal
revenue increases by the same amount, causing the price to rise by an amount
equal to the ratio of the slope of the demand curve to the slope of the marginal
revenue curve times the amount of the cost change”).
210. See, e.g., Celine Bonnet et al, Empirical Evidence on the Role of Nonlinear Wholesale Pricing and Vertical Restraints on Cost Pass-Through, 95 REV.
ECON. & STAT. 500, 562 (2013) (explaining incomplete pass-through rates in the
German coffee market).
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retail prices.”211 Hellerstein and Villas-Boas observe that microeconomic and industrial organization studies “provide possible
mechanisms for formalizing the reasons that price does not
equal costs and thus for why changes in costs may not be passed
through into prices.”212 Many studies of cost pass-through based
on currency exchange rates find that prices are not responsive to
changes in exchange rates.213 According to one survey, “incomplete pass-through is a common and pervasive phenomenon
across a broad range of countries.”214 Brun-Aguerre et al. find
that the short-run and the long-run exchange rate pass-through
elasticities for the US “appear to be at the low-end of the spectrum for [developed markets] in line with previous studies.”215
The rate of cost pass-through for excise taxes is higher in some
retail markets but this may be due to slim margins in retail and
uniformity in pricing.216

211. Id. at 500; see also José Manuel Campa & Linda S. Goldberg, Exchange
Rate Pass-Through into Import Prices, 87 REV. ECON. & STAT. 679, 682 (2005).
212. Rebecca Hellerstein & Sofia B. Villas-Boas, Outsourcing and PassThrough, 81 J. INT’L ECON. 170, 171 (2010).
213. Charles Engel, Expenditure Switching and Exchange-Rate Policy, 17
NAT’L BUREAU ECON. RES. 231, 268 (2002) (stating “consumer prices are not
very responsive to exchange rates”).
214. Jayant Menon, Exchange Rate Pass‐Through, 9 J. ECON. SURV. 197,
224 (1995).
215. Raphael Brun-Aguerre, Ana-Maria Fuertes, & Kate Phylaktis, Exchange Rate Pass-Through into Import Prices Revisited: What Drives it?, 31 J.
INT’L MONEY & FIN. 818, 825 (2012); see also Janine Aron, Ronald Macdonald
& John Muellbauer, Exchange Rate Pass-Through in Developing and Emerging
Markets: A Survey of Conceptual, Methodological and Policy Issues, and Selected Empirical Findings, 50 J. DEV. STUD. 101, 136 (asserting that micro-data
studies for industrial countries on exchange rate pass-through (ERPT) find that
“[h]eterogeneous ERPT estimates are typically reported at the sectoral and
goods levels, and ERPT is delayed and incomplete for imports and both retail
and wholesale domestic prices”); Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg & Michael M.
Knetter, Goods, Prices, and Exchange Rates: What Have We Learned?, 35 J.
ECON. LITERATURE 1243 (1997); Jiawen Yang, Exchange Rate Pass-Through in
U.S. Manufacturing Industries, 79 REV. ECON. & STAT. 95, 95 (1997).
216. See Alberto Cavallo, More Amazon Effects: Online Competition and
Pricing Behaviors (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 25138, 2018);
see also Gunter J. Hitsch, Ali Hortacsu, & Xiliang Lin, Prices and Promotions
in U.S. Retail Markets: Evidence from Big Data 17–18 (Nat. Bureau of Econ.
Res. Working Paper 26306, 2019); Stefano DellaVigna & Matthew Gentzkow,
Uniform Pricing in U.S. Retail Chains, 1, 22 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 23996, 2019) (explaining the uniform pricing puzzle in retail);
Tuomas Kosonen & Riikka Savolainen, A Case for Aero Effect of Sin Taxes on
Consumption? Evidence from a Sweets Tax Reform (June 6, 2019) (unpublished
article) (on file with the National Tax Association) (showing a high rate of pass-
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IV. ANTITRUST POLICY TOWARD PATENT LICENSING
This section explores the implications of market negotiation
for antitrust policy toward patent licensing. Negotiation of patent license agreements allows both patent holders and technology adopters to share in the benefits of technology transfers. A
more accurate view of market institutions and market outcomes
should help avoid the significant economic and legal costs of misguided antitrust policies. Hypothetical predictions based on the
“Cournot Effect” have generated antitrust scrutiny, regulatory
interventions, and many court decisions.217 These policy cures
can be much worse than the imagined disease. The result is antitrust policies that impede competitive conduct, discourage invention and innovation, and weaken protections for IP rights.
Antitrust policies based on inaccurate descriptions of market institutions and market outcomes would adversely impact the rate
and direction of technological change.
A. “ROYALTY STACKING”
“Royalty stacking” refers to the possibility that patent holders with complementary inventions will choose total royalties
that exceed the royalties that would be chosen by a bundling monopoly patent holder. The “royalty stacking” concern is simply a
restatement of the “Cournot Effect” in terms of royalties per unit
of output. The “royalty stacking” concern is just the multiple
marginalization problem described by Cournot.218

through of excise taxes in retail); R. Andrew Butters, Daniel W. Sacks, &
Boyoung Seo, How do National Firms Respond to Local Shocks? Evidence from
Excise Taxes (Sept. 11, 2020) (unpublished article) (on file with the National
Bureau of Economic Research); Etienne Gagnon & David Lopez-Salido, Small
Price Responses to Large Demand Shocks, 18 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 792, 794
(2019).
217. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL
2111217 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013) (discussing “royalty stacking”); Ericsson,
Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (same); Unwired Planet
Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Techs. Co. [2017] EWHC 711 (Pat) (same).
218. Damien Geradin, Anne Layne-Farrar & Jorge Padilla, The Complements Problem Within Standard Setting: Assessing the Evidence on Royalty
Stacking, 14 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 144, 148 (2008); Damien Geradin & M.
Rato, Can Standard-Setting Lead to Exploitative Abuse? A Dissonant View on
Patent Hold-up, Royalty Stacking, and the Meaning of FRAND, 3 EUR. COMPETITION J. 101, 122 (2007); J. Gregory Sidak, Holdup, Royalty Stacking, and the
Presumption of Injunctive Relief for Patent Infringement: A Reply to Lemley and
Shapiro, 92 MINN. L. REV. 714 (2008); see Einar Elhauge, Do Patent Holdup and
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The issue of “royalty stacking” arises as a possibility in various legal cases, yet without any evidence. For example, Ericsson
v. D-Link states that “[r]oyalty stacking can arise when a standard implicates numerous patents, perhaps hundreds, if not thousands. If companies are forced to pay royalties to all SEP holders, the royalties will ‘stack’ on top of each other and may become
excessive in the aggregate.”219 Huawei v. ZTE cites the European
Commission:
[a]ccording to the Commission, ‘hold-up is exacerbated where a large
number of SEPs, covering various standards, are applied to a single
product. In such circumstances, the number of potential licensors may
cause the combined royalty payments made to the various SEP-holders
to become excessive. This phenomenon is known as ‘royalty stacking.’220

Negotiation of patent license agreements in a competitive
market is sufficient to avoid the problem of “royalty stacking.”
Patent royalties involve more than constant charges per unit of
output.221 Royalties may be contingent on prices, revenues, or
profits.222 The negotiation framework shows that with bilateral
negotiation, patent holders and technology adopters will avoid
royalties that are constant per unit of output and will rely instead on contingent royalties. This framework further shows
that a bundling monopolist will avoid royalties that are constant
per unit of output, relying instead on contingent royalties.
Negotiation in a competitive market avoids “royalty stacking” because the total share of producer profit, net of the value
of the best alternative, will be lower with negotiation than with
a bundling monopoly patent holder. So, total royalties will be
lower with negotiation than with a bundling monopoly patent
holder. With negotiation, each pairing of patent holder and technology adopter chooses royalties as a best response to the royalties they anticipate the adopter will pay other patent holders.
This important institutional feature of negotiation avoids the
free-rider effects associated with take-it-or-leave-it pricing. So,

Royalty Stacking Lead to Systematically Excessive Royalties?, 4 J. COMP. L. &
ECON. 535, 566 (2008) (critically discussing these issues).
219. Ericsson, 773 F.3d at 1209.
220. Case C-170/13, Huawei Technologies Co. v. ZTE Corp.,
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2391 n.14 (November 20, 2014).
221. See generally Goldscheider, supra note 80 (discussing the nature and
calculation of patent royalties as a whole).
222. Id.
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negotiation is sufficient to lower royalties below the bundling
monopoly level.
“Royalty stacking” concerns should not drive antitrust policy or legal decisions. Because most patent license agreements
are negotiated, hypothetical predictions of “royalty stacking”
based on the “Cournot Effect” are invalid. In addition, evidence
shows that the predictions of “royalty stacking” are highly inaccurate.223 For example, in mobile telecommunications, it is estimated that royalties make up around 5 per cent of mobile handset revenues and less than 2 per cent of total of handset revenues
and mobile telecommunications operator revenues.224 The high
profitability of handset producers and mobile telecommunications operators further suggests that predictions of “royalty
stacking” are incorrect.225
Markets for patent license agreements in industries with
technology standards refute predictions of market failure with
complementary inventions. The market for mobile wireless products is an important example because mobile phone handsets include many complementary inventions. Royalties for patent license agreements involving mobile phones have been
contentious issues for multiple generations of technology standards, 2G, 3G, 4G, and 5G.226 Stasik writes:
223. See, e.g. Keith Mallinson, Cumulative Mobile-SEP Royalty Payments
No More Than Around 5% of Mobile Handset Revenues, WISEHARBOR (Aug. 19,
2015, 7:59 PM) (“Vested interests including leaders at the mobile operator dominated NGMN Alliance1 promote the notion that patent licensing fee rates are
‘perceived’ to be too high in mobile technologies; but without substantiation for
such claims . . . . [sometimes] based on theories of hold-up and royalty stacking
that lack empirical support . . . ”).
224. See id. (“As a percentage of all consumer charges, including handset
costs and $1.13 trillion in mobile operator services, which are also highly dependent on SEP technologies, the cumulative royalty yield shrinks to 1.3 percent.”).
225. See Keith Mallinson, Don’t Fix What Isn’t Broken: The Extraordinary
Record of Innovation and Success in the Cellular Industry Under Existing Licensing Practices, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 967, 968 (2016) (“This Article argues
that the enormous value produced by patented technologies—as compared to
the relatively low costs to producers of obtaining that technology—enables the
explosion of innovation and market development occurring around the world,
indicating that patent royalties are far from excessive.”).
226. See Stasik, supra note 76, at 114–19 (providing an overview of current
issues in establishing royalty rates through the lens of LTE); see also LARRY
GOLDSTEIN & BRIAN KEARSEY, TECHNOLOGY PATENT LICENSING: AN INTERNATIONAL REFERENCE ON 21ST CENTURY PATENT LICENSING, PATENT POOLS, AND
PATENT PLATFORMS (2004). For a discussion of 5G technology standards, see
e.g., INS. OF ELEC. AND ELECS. ENG’RS., IEEE 5G AND BEYOND TECHNOLOGY
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Like a sequel to a successful movie, LTE includes many elements of the
original release and offers a few new twists. This is especially true
when it comes to the matter of licensing essential IPRs for the LTE
standard. Audiences can expect to see the same licensing challenges
that first appeared in GSM (2G) and which re-appeared in UMTS (3G)
starring again in LTE (4G). The plot is essentially the same: lots of
essential patents and many different patent holders.227

In mobile telecommunications, profit margins have remained stable, the quality and variety of consumer devices has
increased rapidly, and average prices of smartphones have fallen
while quality and functionality have increased.228
Empirical evidence shows that companies at various levels
of the value chain have market power in industries with technology standards.229 This fully refutes the notion that patent owners have complete or even significant market power, as suggested by applications of the Cournot model to SEP licensing.
The telecommunications industry has evolved from full vertical
integration to a value chain with considerable outsourcing, and
then to a complex value network with many important players.230
In mobile communications, carriers, handset manufacturers, and various component and parts suppliers have market
power.231 As Jason Dedrick et al. find, “carriers capture the
greatest value (in terms of gross profit) from each handset, followed closely by handset makers, with suppliers a distant
third . . . [h]owever, the situation is reversed in terms of
ROADMAP
WHITE
PAPER
(2017),
https://futurenetworks.ieee.org/images/files/pdf/ieee-5g-roadmap-white-paper.pdf.
227. Stasik, supra note 76, at 114.
228. See Kirti Gupta, Technology Standards and Competition in the Mobile
Wireless Industry, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 865, 891, 893, 895 (2015) (analyzing
each level of the mobile wireless industry to conclude that consistent profit margins, growth in consumer products, and decreasing average smartphone prices
all point to a thriving, competitive industry.).
229. Id. at 891 (“[F]irms in the mobile wireless industry do not display any
first-order indication of competitive harm from patent hold-up or royalty stacking.”).
230. See Feng Li & Jason Whalley, Deconstruction of the Telecommunications Industry: From Value Chain to Value Networks, 26 TELECOMM. POL’Y 451
(2002) (providing an overview and analysis of the rapidly evolving telecommunications industry, with specific focus on increasing complexities in the value
chain).
231. See, e.g., Upender Subramanian, Jagmohan S. Raju & Z. John Zhang,
Exclusive Handset Arrangements in the Wireless Industry: A Competitive Analysis, 32 MARKETING SCI. 246 (2013) (discussing negotiation between carriers
and handset providers, with focus on exclusive arrangements).
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operating profit.”232 Dedrick et al. show that “[c]ompanies at all
levels of the supply chain compete with rivals for market share
and profits and negotiate with their suppliers and customers to
appropriate more of the profits from innovation.”233 Patent holders are only one set of players in a complex industry value network that also consists of the carriers, handset manufacturers,
and suppliers.
B. “STANDARD ESSENTIAL PATENT HOLDUP”
Negotiation between technology adopters and patent holders helps realize the benefits of technology standards. “SEP
holdup” provides an inaccurate characterization of patent license negotiation. “SEP holdup” should not be used to guide either antitrust policy or court decisions. Studies of “SEP holdup”
provide very weak evidence of either patent holdup or royalty
stacking.234
i. “SEP Holdup” and the “Cournot Effect”
“SEP holdup” alleges that complementary inventions create
problems in industries with technology standards.235 On the basis of “SEP holdup,” there are calls for industries to turn back
the clock so that technology adopters and patent holders negotiate patent license agreements before standardization.236 The
232. Jason Dedrick, Kenneth L. Kraemer & Greg Linden, The Distribution
of Value in the Mobile Phone Supply Chain, 35 TELECOMM. POL’Y 505, 505
(2011).
233. Id. at 517.
234. See, e.g., Vincenzo Denicolò et al., Revisiting Injunctive Relief: Interpreting eBay in High-Tech Industries with Non-Practicing Patent Holders, 4 J.
COMP. L. & ECON. 571, 600 (2008) (“Taking all of the evidence together, we find
the proof of prevalent, recurring patent holdup, and royalty stacking in hightech industries to be extremely weak.”).
235. See id. at 573 (“According to the holdup argument, once a manufacturer
has invested in a plant and equipment to produce a particular good, the ﬁrms
with patents relevant for that good can ask for and receive more than their fair
share of the proﬁts, since the manufacturer risks losing its entire investment if
it cannot obtain a license to the patent.”); Farrell et al., supra note 31 (providing
an overview of patent holdup and standardization issues); Melamed & Shapiro,
supra note 31, at 2111 (“Without some checks, SEP owners could opportunistically engage in patent holdup, taking advantage of the fact that the firms and
users adopting the standard become individually and collectively locked in to
the standard over time.”).
236. See Farrell et al., supra note 31, at 621 (“[A]llowing hold-up is a costly
way to provide rents to patent holders. For instance, users fearing patent ambush would have an incentive to . . . insist on ex ante negotiation.”).
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“SEP holdup” concern also motivates recommendations for
weakening IP rights, including limits on injunctions.237
The concept of “SEP holdup” combines the effects of standardization on negotiation and “royalty stacking.” In Ericsson v.
D-Link, the court notes both concepts as potentially problematic
for standard adoption, asserting that “patent hold-up exists
when the holder of an SEP demands excessive royalties after
companies are locked into using a standard.”238 Huawei v. ZTE
identifies injunctions as a cause of excessive royalties:
[a]ccording to the referring court, SEP-holders are in a powerful position when negotiating licences [sic] because of their right to bring an
action for a prohibitory injunction. Consequently, it should be ensured
that SEP-holders cannot, for example, impose excessive royalties in
breach of their commitment to grant licences [sic] on FRAND terms,
thereby engaging in conduct which has become known as ‘patent holdup.’239

Unwired v. Huawei, in contrast, finds that FRAND commitments are sufficient to address holdup.240
The concept of “SEP holdup” is based on contradictory arguments because patent holders are said to both negotiate and not
to negotiate.241 This concept applies two economic models with
assumptions that are inconsistent with each other. “SEP holdup”
asserts that patent holders take advantage of adopters in negotiation after technology standards are developed.242 The argument is that adopters are “locked in” to a technology and

237. Id. at 610 (noting that potential patent reforms in response to holdup
concerns could include “in some cases limiting patent holders’ ability to obtain
injunctions”).
238. Ericsson, 773 F.3d at 1208.
239. C-170/13,
Huawei
Technologies
Co.
v.
ZTE
Corp.,
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2391477 ¶ 41 (November 20, 2014).
240. Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. [2017]
EWHC 711 (Pat), at 155 (“An appropriate way to determine a FRAND royalty
is to determine a benchmark rate which is governed by the value of the patentee’s portfolio. That will be fair, reasonable and generally non-discriminatory. The rate does not vary depending on the size of the licensee. It will eliminate hold-up and hold-out. Small new entrants are entitled to pay a royalty
based on the same benchmark as established large entities.”).
241. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 30 (analyzing patent holdup and royalty
stacking with two models: a model with bilateral negotiation and a variant of
the Cournot model, which assumes royalties that are per unit of output and
100% cost pass-through). The downstream producer is a monopolist, however,
which would suggest that patent holders would not choose royalties that are
constant per unit of output. Id.
242. See Melamed & Shapiro, supra note 31, at 2111.
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therefore pay higher royalties than they would before standardization.243 At the same time, however, “SEP holdup” asserts that
patent holders collectively engage in “royalty stacking” by setting royalty rates without negotiation.244 “SEP holdup” concludes that “royalty stacking” due to the “Cournot Effect” magnifies the effects of technology standards on negotiation.245
The negotiation framework presented here is useful in untangling these inconsistent aspects of the “SEP holdup” argument. Because most patent license agreements are negotiated,
including those involving SEPs, it is inconsistent to assert that
alleged “royalty stacking” based on the “Cournot Effect” will occur. Although there may be many SEPs in industries with technology standards, the number of complementary patents does
not in itself indicate a problem. Negotiation takes into account
the royalties in other patent license agreements so that total royalties for SEPs do not exceed what a bundling monopolist would
choose. Contrary to “SEP holdup,” “royalty stacking” does not
magnify the effects of technology standards.
The remaining question raised by “SEP holdup” is how
standardization affects negotiation between patent holders and
technology adopters. “SEP holdup” suggests that standardization removes technological options in comparison to what might
have existed before standardization. This is an example of the
problem identified by Demsetz of comparing existing market institutions to some hypothetical ideal norm.246
243. Id. (“Put simply: without some checks, SEP owners could opportunistically engage in patent holdup, taking advantage of the fact that the firms and
users adopting the standard become individually and collectively locked in to
the standard over time.”).
244. Id. at 2114 (“[A]s a practical matter, patent holders are generally able
to recover more than the ex ante [negotiated] value of the patent when litigation
occurs after the implementers are locked in.”).
245. See Shapiro, supra note 32, at 128 (“The need to solve the complements
problem tends to be especially great in the context of standard setting.”); Lemley
& Shapiro, supra note 30, at 1993 (“As a matter of simple arithmetic, royalty
stacking magnifies the problems associated with injunction threats and holdup,
and greatly so if many patents read on the same product. In this key sense, the
problems of injunction threats and royalty stacking are intertwined . . . .
[T]hese added problems result from simple arithmetic: the combined royalty
rate owed to all of the patent holders asserting infringement is equal to the sum
of the royalties owed to each individual patent holder.”); see also Lemley &
Shapiro, supra note 31, at 2007–08 (discussing the Cournot Effect and royalty
stacking generally).
246. Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.
L. & ECON. 1, 1 (1969) (“The view that now pervades much public policy
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“SEP holdup” chooses a benchmark for negotiation based on
technology standards that were never chosen by a standards organization. Such a benchmark would reflect hypothetical technologies that were never fully developed if they existed at all.
This benchmark would never arise in market negotiation. Policy
concerns should not be based on imaginary technologies that
never existed. Negotiating patent licenses before choosing technology standards or even before developing alternative technologies would compare actual patent license negotiation to an impossible ideal.
ii. Negotiation and technology standards
The negotiation framework presented here shows that royalties and the benefits of adopters critically depend on two
things: the profit obtained from applying standardized technology and the value of the best alternative technology. This section
will show that technology standards increase both adopter profit
and the value of the best alternative. With negotiation of patent
license agreements, technology standards make adopters better
off.
Negotiation of patent license agreements between technology adopters and patent holders makes a number of important
contributions to standardization. First, negotiation allows technology adopters and patent holders to share the economic benefits of standardization, with neither side taking unfair advantage of the other.247 Second, negotiation allows technology
adopters and patent holders to avoid distortionary royalties and
to design patent license agreements that maximize joint returns.248 Third, simultaneous bilateral negotiation helps technology adopters and patent holders achieve multilateral coordination. Fourth, negotiation of patent license agreements that
takes place after standardization allows technology adopters
and patent holders to adapt to technological change.249 Finally,
anticipation of negotiation of patent license agreements gives

economics implicitly presents the relevant choice as between an ideal norm and
an existing ‘imperfect’ institutional arrangement.”).
247. See Spulber, supra note 120 (broadly covering the advantages of negotiation).
248. Id.
249. Id.

138

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 22:1

incentives to technology adopters and patent holders to choose
efficient technology standards in standards organizations.250
Technology standards established through voluntary organizations make adopters better off in comparison to markets without technology standards. This is evidenced by the extensive participation of adopters in the standards development process,
which can be costly and time consuming.251 Also, new or revised
technology standards increase the net benefits to adopters in
comparison to previous technology standards, as evidenced by
the widespread adoption of standardized technologies in the
market.252 Technology adopters benefit from negotiation that
takes place after developing and promoting technology standards. This observation is confirmed by the fact that technology
adopters and patent holders almost always choose to negotiate
patent license agreements after a process of technological
change and technology standardization.253
Consider first the effects of the value of the best alternative
to adopters. The value of the best alternative is the adopter’s disagreement payoff in negotiation. All other things being equal,
negotiation implies that royalties are decreasing in the adopter’s
value of the best alternative technology. An increase in the value
of the best alternative technology will decrease royalties for each
complementary invention. An increase in the value of the best
alternative technology also will increase profit net of royalties
for technology adopters, for a given profit level. This is the case
for standard bilateral negotiation.254 This also is the case in the
more general negotiation framework with multiple patent holders and multiple technology adopters.

250. Id.
251. See, e.g., Gupta, supra note 228, at 877–80 (discussing the consensus
method for standards setting, where even “noncontributing firms have power to
influence what is or isn’t adopted as a standardized solution”).
252. Id. at 880 (“The widespread adoption of standards across the mobile
wireless industry and incredible performance improvements from 2G to 3G to
4G indicates that the standard-setting process is likely working.”).
253. See Farrell et al., supra note 31, at 630–31 (asserting that negotiation
before an industry standard is chosen is exceedingly rare).
254. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 30, at 2007 (“The mitigation strategies
therefore raise the joint profits of the patent holder and the downstream firm
in bilateral bargaining.”); Melamed & Shapiro, supra note 31, at 2138 (presenting an equation for royalties under bilateral negotiation); Gilbert, supra note
21, 46–47 (a sample equation for royalties).
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Standardization achieved through voluntary standards organizations increases the value of the best alternative for
adopters in comparison to previous technology standards. By increasing the value of the best alternative for technology
adopters, standardization decreases royalties for each of the
complementary inventions, all other things equal. Standardization also increases the profits of patent holders net of royalties.
The observation that standardization increases the value of
the best alternative for adopters runs contrary to the concern
expressed by “SEP holdup.” The problem lies in choosing the appropriate benchmark for negotiation. The benchmark for private
negotiation should not be chosen by public policy makers. The
institutionally correct benchmark for negotiation should be
based on the alternatives available to market participants rather than hypothetical technologies. The alternatives available
to market participants reflect existing technologies that satisfy
new or revised standards and prior standards.
Standardization by industry consensus is based on technological change, which adds new technologies to the marketplace.
New or revised consensus technology standards recognize the
appearance of additional technologies. Despite a superficial
reading of the term, standardization does not arbitrarily remove
potentially valuable technological alternatives. Rather, technology standards often serve to recognize and illuminate technological change. As noted by the International Standards Organization (ISO), “[a]n ISO International Standard represents a global
consensus on the state of the art in the subject of that standard.”255 This is distinct from government regulatory standards,
which can narrow the number of technologies and limit innovation.256
Standardization through voluntary standards organizations
increases the number and quality of technological alternatives
available to adopters. Consensus standards increase technological alternatives because they promote invention and innovation.

255. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION, ECONOMIC
BENEFITS OF STANDARDS 1 (1st ed. 2011), https://www.iso.org/publication/PUB100288.html.
256. See, e.g., Mehreen Khan, The EU Seeks for Force Through a Single
Standard Phone Charger, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/65a2dd48-4140-11ea-bdb5-169ba7be433d (discussing the European Commission’s mobile phone charger standards, which provide an example of government standards that have had unintentionally restrictive effects).
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“[S]tandardization is an essential part of the microeconomic infrastructure: it enables innovation and acts as a barrier to undesirable outcomes.”257 Standards organizations develop and revise standards to facilitate application and absorption of new
technologies. Increasing the number and quality of technologies
increases the value of the best alternative technology for
adopters.
Technology standards increase the value of technological alternatives because they specify performance quality and improve interoperability of technologies, particularly in information and communications technology (ICT). The ISO creates
“document[s] that provid[e] requirements, specifications, guidelines or characteristics that can be used consistently to ensure
that materials, products, processes and services are fit for their
purpose.”258 ISO has published 22,936 international standards.259 According to the organization, “ISO standards provide
solutions and achieve benefits for almost all sectors of activity,
including agriculture, construction, mechanical engineering,
manufacturing, distribution, transport, medical devices, information and communication technologies, the environment, energy, quality management, conformity assessment and services.”260
Standardization increases the value to adopters from applying new technologies. An advantage of standardization is reduction in the costs of coordination.261 Companies do not need to
257. G. M. PETER SWANN, THE ECONOMICS OF STANDARDIZATION: AN UP(2010), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/economics-of-standardisation-update-to-report; see also G. M. PETER SWANN, THE ECONOMICS OF
STANDARDIZATION (2000), https://sites.google.com/site/gmpswann/home/cv/policy-reports/economics-of-standards (analyzing the economics of standardization
prior to 2000).
258. ISO
Standards,
INST.
OF
ENVTL.
SCI.
&
TECH.,
https://www.iest.org/Standards-RPs/ISO-Standards (last visited Oct. 19, 2020);
see Standards, ISO, https://www.iso.org/standards.html (last visited Oct. 19,
2020) (illustrating the ISO’s own description and definition of ISO standards).
259. The ISO Story, ISO, https://www.iso.org/the-iso-story.html (last visited
Oct. 19, 2020).
260. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION, supra note
255, at 1.
261. See Frank A.G. den Butter, et al., The Transaction Costs Perspective on
Standards as A Source of Trade and Productivity Growth, TINBERGEN INST.
DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 07-090/3, at 20 (Nov. 26, 2007), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1032135 (concluding that standards are important
means to reduce transaction costs and thus may enhance coordination of production processes).
DATE
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negotiate each time to establish technical specifications and interoperability.262 Transaction cost reductions help more companies adopt standard technologies. Standardization increases the
value of the best alternative for adopters because standards increase industry knowledge about technologies and provide interoperability that promotes access to multiple technologies.263
Many technologies can comply with a standard by conforming to
quality and interoperability requirements.
Standardization does not provide a mechanism for patent
holders to “lock in” adopters.264 Instead, standardization makes
it easier to switch to new technologies because other industry
participants have compatible technologies.265 By helping to coordinate technical specifications and interoperability, standardization facilitates adoption of new technologies.266 This decreases
the costs of adjustment to new technologies and increases the
value of technological alternatives for adopters.267
Rather than narrowing industry choices, standardization is
a process of developing product quality and interoperability
specifications.268 Standardization makes it easier to provide
parts, components, and final products that conform to industry
standards.269 These specifications provide opportunities for entry of producers of parts, components, and final products that
meet technological specifications.270 Standardization reduces
the transaction costs associated with industry coordination,

262. See id. at 11 (“When product specifications are standardized and know
[sic] to trading partners, the bargaining process will cover only the price and
conditions of delivery.”).
263. See DIN GERMAN INSTITUTE FOR STANDARDIZATION, ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF STANDARDIZATION 13 (2000), https://www.iec.ch/about/globalreach/academia/pdf/academia_governments/economic_benefits_standardization.pdf
(discussing potential competitive advantage through standards in terms of
knowledge).
264. Daniel F. Spulber, Unlocking Technology: Antitrust and Innovation, 4
J. COMP. L. & ECON. 915, 915 (2008).
265. Id.
266. Id. at 946–47.
267. Id.
268. See, e.g., DIN, supra note 263, at 14 (“Standards offer a wider choice of
suppliers with the same degree of quality.”).
269. Id. (“The application of standards and participation in standards work
relevant to the supplier market can therefore enable a company to exert market
pressure on their suppliers.”). Therefore, under the increased pressure, the suppliers are more likely to supply products that conform to industry standards.
270. Id.
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which also serves to reduce adoption costs. In other words,
standardization increases the benefits of technology adopters
without “lock in”.
Standardization increases the value obtained from the technology used by adopters and the value of the best alternative
technology that complies with the standard. Some SEPs may be
substitutes rather than complements for particular adopters.271
Also, an adopter may choose to supply only some of the many
products that comply with a technology standard.272 For example, an adopter may choose to produce many varieties of mobile
phones, each of which involves different combinations of technologies. A technology adopter may choose among different types of
products, such as say mobile phones versus tablet computers,
each of which would involve different combinations of technologies. This creates alternatives for the technology adopter.
Adopters may not need to obtain all of the SEPs associated
with a particular standard to comply with that standard. SEPs
are declared essential for a standard but a standard potentially
covers a wide range of products.273 Despite their classification as
“essential”, not all SEPs are necessary for every product.274 It
may not be necessary to obtain every SEP declared for a particular standard for every product. Also, some declared SEPs may
be substitutes.275 There are many declared SEPs, with one estimate exceeding 200,000.276 There is evidence of over-declaration
of SEPs.277

271. See, e.g., Spulber, supra note 120, at 156 (mentioning that SEPs can be
“innovative complements” or “innovative substitutes”).
272. For many standards, compliance is voluntary. See, e.g., id. at 94 (“Membership in SSOs and adoption of technology standards is voluntary for all industry participants”). Therefore, an adopter is not forced to supply all products
that comply with a technology standard.
273. See id. at 135 (“The technology standard offers . . . interoperability
across products. Indeed, a technology standard established by an SSO typically
is a class of technologies rather than a particular technology.”).
274. Id. (“[D]eclared essential patents may not be necessary for companies
to conform to the standard.”).
275. Id. at 156 (mentioning that SEPs can be “innovative complements” or
“innovative substitutes”).
276. TIM POHLMANN & KNUT BLIND, supra note 124, at 24. Bekkers et al.
consider a dozen SSOs and find about 4,910 SEP disclosures. Rudi Bekkers et
al., Disclosure Rules and Declared Essential Patents 49 (Nat’l Bureau Econ.
Res., Working Paper No. 23627, 2017), https://www.nber.org/papers/w23627.
277. See Robin Stitzing et al., Over-Declaration of Standard Essential Patents and Determinants of Essentiality 17 (Sept. 4, 2018) (available online),
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Standardization increases the profits of adopters in other
ways besides increasing the number of technological alternatives. New or revised technology standards often represent improvements in product performance.278 Technology standards increase demand for innovative products by certifying quality and
by promoting new product features to consumers.279 Technology
standards increase producer demand for innovative products by
improving interoperability and reducing adoption costs.280 Practically all standard organizations including standards development organizations (SDOs) and industry consortia view their
mission as promoting the adoption of technology standards.281
Technological change and standardization extend beyond
the value of the best alternative technologies available to
adopters. The interaction between innovation and standardization increases the profits of adopters and other industry members.282 By increasing profits, technology standards increase
benefits to both patent holders and technology adopters, contrary to the “SEP holdup” allegation. Patent holders and technology adopters benefit from an increase in the size of the pie to
be divided through negotiation.283 An increase in profits minus
the returns to the best alternative increases royalties received
by patent holders and also increases returns to technology
adopters.
Technology standards often are prospective, that is, standardization provides targets and guidance for R&D.284 Standardization and innovation are related activities that interact over

http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2951617 (basing the research of the over-declaration of SEPs on 79,257 patents in the ETSI database).
278. See Spulber, supra note 120, at 136 (noting that a technology standard
often represents a goal for which technologies do not exist and improvements in
the technology in turn will lead to updates to the standard).
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 86 (“SSOs also establish IP policies that utilize FRAND commitments in order to encourage participate in standard setting and promote adoption of technology standards.”).
282. DIN, supra note 263, at 15 (reaching a conclusion that standardization
helps reduce costs and increase profits).
283. See, e.g., Spulber, supra note 120, at 131 (“FRAND licensing is achieved
by negotiation between those SEP owners and makers of mobile devices and
network equipment.”).
284. Id. at 136.
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time.285 Technologies generally are developed concurrently or
even after technology standards.286 The R&D needed to develop
the new technologies is time consuming, costly, and subject to
considerable uncertainty.287 Standards incorporate technology
proposals from industry participants, many of which are engaged in R&D to develop those technologies.288 Standardization
targets in turn help to guide R&D conducted while standards are
developed.289 Technologies involved in standardization often
have not yet been fully developed during the standardization
process.290 Best alternative technologies often do not exist because they have not yet been developed during the standardization process.291 Standardization both guides and reflects technological change.292
Negotiation of patent license agreements cannot occur before standardization.293 This is because standardization is more
complicated than choosing from a set of available innovative
technologies. It would be inaccurate to suppose that the standardization process simply occurs after innovation.294 Developing
new technologies and technology standards takes time. Consider
for example, the development of generations of standards in mobile telecommunication. Beginning with 1G in 1981 and continuing to 5G in 2021, the generations of technologies each represent about ten years.295 It is predicted that developing the 6G

285. See id. (noting that a technology standard often represents a goal for
which technologies do not exist and improvements in the technology in turns
will lead to updates to the standard).
286. Id.
287. Spulber, supra note 162, at 810.
288. Id. at 794 (“Before, or ex ante, multiple technologies may compete to be
incorporated into the standard under consideration.”).
289. See DIN, supra note 263, at 16 (“Business can reduce the economic risk
of their R&D activities by participating in standardization.”).
290. Spulber, supra note 120, at 99 (“Standardization typically does not involve a choice between a set of fully developed technology alternatives.”).
291. Id.
292. See Spulber, supra note 162, at 825 (concluding that technology standards provide important guide and indication of technological change).
293. Spulber, supra note 120, at 98 (noticing that this results from IP policies).
294. Stitzing et al., supra note 277, at 12.
295. See Azar Taufique et al.,, Planning Wireless Cellular Networks of Future: Outlook, Challenges and Opportunities, 5 IEEE ACCESS 4821, 4831 (2017)
(discussing this hirtory of cellular technology generations); see also Dino Flore,
Tentative 3GPP Timeline for 5G, 3GPP.ORG (Mar. 17, 2015),
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mobile telecommunications standards and technologies will take
another ten years, with a possible introduction after 2030.296
Standardization takes time because of the difficulties in information exchange, discussions in technical committees, and
decision making within standard development organizations
(SDOs). Standardization is a process of industry consensus
building by members of standards organizations.297 The members of standards organizations include not only inventors and
innovators, but also suppliers of parts and components and producers of products and services.298 The process of establishing
standards requires extensive discussions because of the time required to understand potential technologies and the time involved in consensus decision making. Standards organizations
require declaration of SEPs before the relevant technological
specifications are incorporated in standards.299
Some argue for restrictions on injunctions because of the alleged effects of “SEP holdup” negotiation.300 Injunctions, however, are simply a legal mechanism for enforcing IP rights and
preventing infringement.301 The effects of injunctions on patent
license agreements are limited because injunctions require court
https://www.3gpp.org/news-events/1674-timeline_5g (showing a 3GPP endorsed tentative time line for standardizing 5G).
296. 6G RESEARCH VISIONS 1, KEY DRIVERS AND RESEARCH CHALLENGES
FOR 6G UBIQUITOUS WIRELESS INTELLIGENCE 6G FLAGSHIP 4 (Matti Latva-aho
& Kari Leppänen eds., 2019) (“This new wave of technology will accelerate the
digitalisation of economies and society. Historically, a new mobile ‘generation’
appears approximately every ten years, with 6G expected to emerge around
2030.”).
297. See, e.g., Consumers and Standards: Partnership for a Better World,
ISO, https://www.iso.org/sites/ConsumersStandards/1_standards.html (last
visited Oct. 25, 2020) (“An ISO International Standard represents a global consensus on the state of the art in the subject of that standard.”).
298. Id. (“[T]he process allows for input and consensus building, first among
market players and experts at the drafting stages of the standards . . . .”).
299. Spulber, supra note 120, at 98.
300. See, e.g., Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 30, at 1993 (“[T]he threat of an
injunction can dramatically influence the negotiations between a single patent
owner and an alleged infringer, especially if the patented technology covers one
component of a complex product.”)
301. See Injunctions and Restraining Orders in Patent Infringement Cases,
JUSTIA, https://www.justia.com/intellectual-property/patents/infringement/injunctions-and-restraining-orders-in-patent-infringement-cases/ (last visited
Oct. 25, 2020) (“If you can show that the defendant likely infringed on a valid
patent that you own, you may be able to get an injunction from the judge that
orders the defendant to stop the infringement. An injunction is not a substitute
for damages . . . .”).
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approval.302 The eBay decision placed limitations on injunctions
by patent holders that have affected subsequent court decisions.303 SSO FRAND commitments already protect the interests of patent holders and technology adopters in patent license
negotiation.304 Most SSO FRAND policies do not limit injunctions by patent holders, with the exception of the Institute of
Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE).305
The “SEP holdup” concept extends earlier arguments regarding “patent holdup” in patent license negotiation.306 The
“patent holdup” problem is said to occur if switching costs decrease the value of the adopter’s best alternative thus increasing
royalties.307 This purported problem also suggests that patent
holders take improper advantage of technology adopters.308 As
noted previously, the “patent holdup” concept has been highly
influential.309
Adopters benefit from competition among substitute technologies, which increases the value of the best alternative.310
Firms may incur switching costs when adopting new

302. Id. (“An injunction is an order by a court . . . .”).
303. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006); see Christopher B. Seaman, Permanent Injunctions in Patent Litigation After eBay: An
Empirical Study, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1949, 2002 (2015) (analyzing the implications of the Supreme Court’s 2006 decision in eBay v. MercExchange on subsequent patent infringement cases); Ryan T. Holte & Christopher B. Seaman, Patent Injunctions on Appeal: An Empirical Study of the Federal Circuit’s
Application of eBay, 92 WASH. L. REV. 145, 145 (2017) (“More than ten years
after the United States Supreme Court’s landmark decision in eBay v. MercExchange, the availability of injunctive relief in patent cases remains hotly
contested.”).
304. See Spulber, supra note 120, at 118 (illustrating that patent license
agreements protect the reasonable expectation of parties in the context of SSO
FRAND).
305. Id. at 125.
306. Id. at 133 (mentioning that “‘patent holdup’ . . . may be termed ‘SEP
holdup’ to distinguish from the basic switching cost story”).
307. Id. at 132–33 (analyzing two related public policy concerns that “patent
holdup” refers to).
308. Id.
309. Id. at 133 (mentioning that the “patent holdup” concept is popular).
310. Elhauge, supra note 218, at 537 (commenting on Lemley and Shapiro,
and observing that “their holdup model does not apply in cases where multiple
patent-licensees compete downstream. In such cases, competition will likely
drive royalties toward patent value. Nor does their holdup model apply in cases
where multiple patent-owners compete upstream. In such cases, royalties will
tend to be inefficiently low”).
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technologies.311 Switching costs include organizational adjustment costs, and absorption costs, such as the costs of learning
about the new technology and learning how to use the new technology.312 These are related to producer adjustment costs normally encountered in installing capital equipment or introducing worker tasks. If a patented technology has high adjustment
costs, the producer will be more likely to adopt an alternative.
Conversely, if an alternative technology has high adjustment
costs, the producer is more likely to adopt a patented technology.
Some switching costs only come into play if the technology
adopter already is using the patented technology and must design around existing technology before adopting an alternative
technology. Producers routinely incur such switching costs as innovations displace existing technologies.
C. “PATENT THICKETS,” “BLOCKING PATENTS,” AND THE
“TRAGEDY OF THE ANTI-COMMONS”
Negotiation of patent license agreements realizes the benefits of increases in the number of patents. Negotiation of patent
license agreements in a competitive market avoids multiple marginalization.313 Negotiation of patent license agreements generates total royalties that are less than what a bundling monopolist inventor would charge.314 Bilateral negotiation of patent
license agreements allows technology adopters and patent holders to achieve multilateral coordination.315 These advantages of
negotiation are not affected by the number of patents.316
The negotiation framework presented here shows that increases in the number of patents increases benefits for technology adopters. Increases in the number of patents offer the potential for technological change and economic growth.317 An
increase in patents reflects more inventions and innovations
311. Spulber, supra note 162, at 801.
312. Id.
313. Spulber, supra note 41, at 61–62.
314. See generally id. (discussing the effect negotiations have on a bundled
monopolist’s price).
315. See Spulber, supra note 162, at 800 (discussing the impact of bilateral
negotiations on adopters and patent holders).
316. Spulber, supra note 41 (showing that the number of patents is not a
factor for calculating the impact of negotiations).
317. See
Economic
Development
and
Patents,
WIPO,
https://www.wipo.int/patent-law/en/developments/economic.html (last visited
Oct. 25, 2020) (demonstrating that patents promote economic development).
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rather than dispersion of a given amount of IP. An increase in
rate of patenting is a positive indicator of the strength of invention and innovation. Complementary patents, in particular, offer
the benefits of technological synergies because inventions increase the economic benefits of other inventions.318 Complementary inventions suggest a virtuous cycle as new inventions increase adopter benefits, and greater adopter benefits provide
incentives for further invention and innovation.319
Some researchers and policy makers have expressed concerns that there are just “too many patents.” Not surprisingly,
public policy recommendations argue for reductions in the number of patents. These policy concerns are variously referred to as
“patent thickets,” “blocking patents,” and the “Tragedy of the
Anti-Commons.” It is suggested that patent holders demand
payment like trolls under a bridge.320 Patent holders are said to
collect tolls like medieval barons on the Rhine River.321 Advocates describe complementary patents as dense bushes or trees
that require hacking through or weeds that should be cleared.322
Ayres and Parchomovsky refer to patents as an “information
haze” comparable to environmental pollution and depletion of
ocean fisheries.323 They suggest that the United States Patent
and Trademark Office (USPTO) increase renewal fees to decrease the number of patents or institute quantity regulation of
the number of the patents combined with tradeable patent
rights, another way of raising the costs of obtaining a patent.324

318. Spulber, supra note 120, at 137 (“The combination of complementary
components often results in complex systems that generate benefits greater
than can be achieved by separate groups of components.”).
319. See, e.g., id. at 82 (“SSOs thus increase the rate of technological change
because industry participants create complementary inventions and innovations.”).
320. Anne Layne-Farrar & Klaus M. Schmidt, Licensing Complementary Patents: “Patent Trolls,” Market Structure, and “Excessive” Royalties, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L. J., 1121, 1121 (2010).
321. Michael Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: A Concise Introduction and Lexicon, 76 MOD. L. REV. 6, 9–10 (2013).
322. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 32, at 120 (describing a patent thicket as
“a dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must
hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology”); Ayres
& Parchomovsky, supra note 32, at 865 (“[W]e seek to explore two alternative
mechanisms that may be used to weed out patent thickets.”).
323. Ayres & Parchomovsky, supra note 32, at 866.
324. Id. at 865.
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Many of the arguments for “patent thickets,” “blocking patents,” and the “Tragedy of the Anti-Commons” are based on the
Cournot model.325 An increase in the number of complementary
property rights adversely affects market outcomes by intensifying the “Cournot Effect.” Having more complementary patents
exacerbates the free-rider effect and thus increases total royalties.326 In turn, increases in royalties deter invention because future inventors will need to obtain patents to conduct R&D.327
Also, increases in royalties deter innovation by decreasing adoption of patented technologies.328
These concerns hinge on the assumptions of the Cournot
model. As has been emphasized, the Cournot model assumes
“take-it-or-leave-it” pricing rather than negotiation.329 The
Cournot model assumes that IP holders have 100% of the market
power in both markets for invention and downstream product
markets. The Cournot model assumes that there is 100% pass
through of royalty costs to downstream product prices. Together,
these assumptions generate the result that an increase in the
number of IP holders increases the severity of the “Cournot Effect.”
The arguments for “patent thickets,” “blocking patents,” and
the “Tragedy of the Anti-Commons” also are based on transaction costs.330 Inventors and innovators are deterred because they

325. See, e.g., Charles deGrazia, Jesse Frumkin & Nicholas A. Pairolero,
Embracing Invention Similarity for the Measurement of Vertically Overlapping
Claims
1-2
(USPTO
ECON.
Working
Paper,
No.
2018-01,
2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3166042 (describing the patent thicket problem as being based on the “Cournot complements problem”); Shapiro, supra note
32, at 119 (defining a patent thicket as “an overlapping set of patent rights requiring that those seeking to commercialize new technology obtain licenses from
multiple patentees”).
326. deGrazia, Frumkin, & Pairolero, supra note 325, at 1–2.
327. Id. (“We propose a new measure of vertically overlapping claims that
incorporates invention similarity to more precisely identify inventive overlap.
The measure defined in this paper will enable more accurate measurement, and
allow for novel economic research on technological complexity, fragmentation in
intellectual property, and patent thickets within and across all patent jurisdictions.”).
328. Spulber, supra note 120, at 153.
329. Spulber, supra note 27, at 138.
330. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 701 (1998)
(“An anticommons in biomedical research may be more likely to endure than in
other areas of intellectual property because of the high transaction costs of

150

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 22:1

must negotiate with too many patent holders. The transaction
cost argument, however, is inconsistent with the excessive royalty argument. The transaction cost argument is based on the
costs of negotiation whereas the excessive royalty argument is
based on the absence of negotiation, which underpins the
“Cournot Effect.”
The view that there are “too many patents” is fundamentally flawed, even within its own framework. First, the “too
many patents” view, whether based on royalty effects or transaction costs, fails to account for the benefits of patented technologies.331 In this view, patented technologies offer no profits for
technology adopters and no benefits for their customers. The entry of inventors into the marketplace imposes costs without benefits.332 As a consequence, patents appear to be a nuisance that
imposes royalty costs and transaction costs on society. Consideration of the effects of the number of patents on efficiency should
also include the economic benefits of patented technologies.
Second, the “too many patents” view ignores the need for incentives that would motivate inventors and innovators. Invention and innovation require costly capital investment, human
capital, and creativity.333 In the “too many patents” view, technological change arrives like a windfall, without the need for inventive or innovative effort. The economic and legal analysis ignores the contribution of royalties as returns to inventors and
innovators. The number of patents is seen as excessive because
royalties are a cost to society without any corresponding benefit.
Third, the “too many patents” view does not consider the
contributions of the patent system itself to economic efficiency.
Patents provide part of the system of IP rights that allows
bargaining, heterogeneous interests among owners, and cognitive biases of researchers.”).
331. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”); see also, Mark
A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L.R. 1031,
1055 (2005) (“Intellectual property, then, is not a response to allocative distortions resulting from scarcity, as real property law is. Rather, it is a conscious
decision to create scarcity in a type of good in which it is ordinarily absent in
order to artificially boost the economic returns to innovation.”).
332. See, e.g., Buchanan & Yoon, supra note 34, at 5–10.
333. For a general discussion of this point, see Stephen Haber, Patents and
the Wealth of Nations, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV 811, 834 (2016) (“[T]wo very different bodies of scholarship . . . yield the same answer: there is a causal relationship between strong patents and innovation.”).
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markets for IP to form.334 Markets offer efficiencies in the allocation of technologies. Patents decrease transaction costs of technology transfer by standardizing descriptions of inventions and
by offering certification of inventions as useful, novel, and nonobvious. Patents support all kinds of related transactions, including cross-licensing and financing based on patents as collateral assets.
Negotiation of patent license agreements addresses the interaction of complementary patent license agreements. There is
considerable evidence that there is widespread usage of patent
license agreements.335 A number of institutional solutions address transactions costs and coordination with complementary
patents. Many companies offer licenses for patent portfolios,
which provide transaction cost efficiencies in comparison with
licensing individual patents.336 Patent license agreements improve coordination when there are complementary inventions.337
Patents facilitate the entry of innovative specialist firms.338 Intermediaries such as patent aggregators and patent pools also
address transaction costs in comparison with licensing individual patents, as will be discussed further in the next section.
A number of other market institutions address transaction
costs with complementary patents. Cockburn et al. find mixed
effects of patent ownership diffusion on innovation, with firms
adjusting their R&D and in-licensing decisions.339 Graff et al.
334. See generally Spulber, supra note 50 (asserting, for instance, that such
a system “increases transaction efficiencies”).
335. See Bharat N. Anand & Tarun Khanna, The Structure of Licensing Contracts, 48 J. INDUS. ECON.103, 103 (2000) (“Licensing is . . . one of the most commonly observed inter-firm contractual agreements.”); Spulber, supra note 120,
at 134.
336. Elyse Dorsey, Building Patent Portfolios to Facilitate Cross-Licensing
Agreements: Implications for Merger Efficiency Analysis, 15 COLUM. SCI. &
TECH. L. REV. 125, 135 (2013) (“[P]ortfolios do play an important role in both
reducing litigation and transactions costs.”).
337. ASHISH ARORA ET AL., MARKETS FOR TECHNOLOGY: THE ECONOMICS OF
INNOVATION AND CORPORATE STRATEGY 171 (2001); Ashish Arora & Robert P.
Merges, Specialized Supply Firms, Property Rights and Firm Boundaries, 13
INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 451 (2004); Ashish Arora & Marco Ceccagnoli, Patent
Protection, Complementary Assets, and Firms’ Incentives for Technology Licensing, 52 MGMT. SCI. 293 (2006).
338. Damien Geradin et al., Elves or Trolls? The Role of Nonpracticing Patent Owners in the Innovation Economy, 21 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 73, 78
(2011).
339. Iain M. Cockburn et al., Patent Thickets, Licensing and Innovative Performance, 19 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 899, 901 (2010) (providing “the first
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find that biotechnology firms use combinations of R&D and merger and acquisition (M&A) strategies.340 Ziedonis finds evidence
that firms address transaction costs by acquiring patents.341
Galasso & Schankerman suggest that having more complementary patents in an industry may induce more rapid settlement
in patent disputes.342 The court in Acorda Therapeutics, which
addresses “blocking patents,” observed that companies facing
patent expiration will pursue strategies such as “product-line extension (new formulations, new combinations), new indications,
or a follow-on product.”343
There is mixed empirical support for the dire predictions of
“patent thickets” and “blocking patents.” Empirical analyses of
“patent thickets” offer minimal evidence of economic inefficiency. Hall et al. conduct an extensive survey that documents
growth in the number of patents in the US and UK, but observed
that “[o]ur report reveals a lack of empirical evidence on the
direct evidence of a negative relationship between the fragmentation of upstream IP rights and the innovative performance of in-licensing firms . . . a provocative positive relationship between fragmentation and innovative performance among firms that do not in-license . . . [and] suggestive evidence that the
effects of patent thickets may depend on the size of a firm’s own patent portfolio”).
340. Gregory D. Graff et al., Agricultural Biotechnology’s Complementary Intellectual Assets, 85 REV. ECON. STAT. 349, 362 (2003) (“These ﬁndings support
the hypothesis that the industry’s recent restructuring is causally driven by the
attempt of ﬁrms to achieve coordination between complementary intellectual
assets in the face of the difﬁculties or transaction costs of accessing these assets
externally.”).
341. Rosemarie H. Ziedonis, Don’t Fence Me In: Fragmented Markets for
Technology and the Patent Acquisition Strategies of Firms, 50 MGMT. SCI. 804,
817 (“I find that firms acquire patents more aggressively than otherwise predicted when markets for technological inputs are highly fragmented (i.e., when
rights to a firm’s complementary patents are widely distributed among outside
parties).”).
342. Alberto Galasso & Mark Schankerman, Patent Thickets, Courts, and
the Market for Innovation, 41 RAND J. ECON. 472, 501 (2010) (“We develop a
model of patent litigation which predicts that settlement agreements are
reached more quickly in the presence of fragmented patent rights and when
there is less uncertainty about court outcomes, as was the case after the introduction of the ‘pro-patent’ appellate court.”); see also Doug Lichtman, Patent
Holdouts and the Standard-Setting Process (Coase-Sandor Inst. L. & Econ.,
Working Paper No. 292, 2006).
343. Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Roxane Labs., Inc., 903 F.3d 1310, 1341
n.18 (Fed. Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 111 (2019) (citing Chie Hoon Song
& Jeung-Whan Han, Patent Cliff and Strategic Switch: Exploring Strategic Design Possibilities in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 5 SPRINGERPLUS 692, 698–99
(2016)).
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effect of thickets on firm behavior, both in terms of performance
and innovative activity.”344 Their survey finds that the literature
has raised concerns about the social welfare effects of “patent
thickets.”345 However “there is so far very little evidence on the
effects patent thickets have on firm entry.”346 Blind et al. suggest
various strategic motives for patenting by firms, but “the clear
distinction between ‘discrete’ and ‘complex’ industries in the
structure of the patent motives cannot be observed in our sample.”347 Von Graevenitz et al. explain that the growth of patent
applications may be based on technological opportunities and
complexity.348
There is little evidence for the “Tragedy of the Anti-Commons” in biomedical technology.349 For example, some discussions of the “Tragedy of the Anti-Commons” rely on informal anecdotes.350 Caulfield et al. find that there is more anecdote than
evidence in biotechnology:
The combination of a lack of empirical evidence of problems and a mismatch between the problems and proposed solutions may explain why
there has been little actual policy change. In addition, our review of the
lively policy debate and the limited empirical support for the claims
that are driving that debate suggest that policy makers may be responding more to a high-profile anecdote or arguments with high face
validity than they are to systematic data on the issues.351

344. BRONWYN HALL ET AL., A STUDY OF PATENT THICKETS 51 (2012).
345. Id. at 52.
346. Id.
347. Knut Blind et al., Motives to Patent: Empirical Evidence from Germany,
35 RES. POL’Y 655, 671 (2006); see also Knut Blind et al., The Influence of Strategic Patenting on Companies’ Patent Portfolios, 38 RES. POL’Y 428 (2009).
348. Von Graevenitz et al., Incidence and Growth of Patent Thickets: The
Impact of Technological Opportunities and Complexity, 61 J. INDUS. ECON. 521
(2013).
349. Richard A. Epstein & Bruce N. Kuhlik, Is There a Biomedical Anticommons?, REGULATION, Summer 2004, at 54, 56.
350. See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the
Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 621–88 (1998) (developing the theory of anticommons property through the example of post-1990
Moscow); id. at 700(“When owners have conflicting goals and each can deploy
its rights to block the strategies of the others, they may not be able to reach an
agreement that leaves enough private value for downstream developers to bring
products to the market.”); MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: HOW
TOO MUCH OWNERSHIP WRECKS MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION, AND COSTS
LIVES 49–78 (2008) (providing a series of narratives to anticommons theory in
the biomedical field).
351. Timothy Caulfield et al., Evidence and Anecdotes: An Analysis of Human Gene Patenting Controversies, 24 NATURE BIOTECH. 1091, 1094 (2006).
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According to Buckley, the “Tragedy of the Anti-Commons”
may simply be a myth in the biotechnology industry.352 Barnett
observes that the lack of evidence for the “Tragedy of the Anticommons” suggests that this concern should not be used as a
guide for public policy:
[T]he paucity of empirical evidence to support the AC [anti-commons]
thesis reduces confidence in proposals to weaken IP rights in order to
protect the market from AC effects. Conversely, the abundance of empirical evidence for markets’ self-corrective capacities raises confidence
that robust IP protection carries little threat of deadlock.353

Barnett finds little evidence of persistent effects of the number
of patents on markets for IP.354
D. “REGULATORY PATENT POOLS”
Negotiation of patent license agreements in competitive
markets generally is sufficient to achieve economic efficiency
with complementary inventions. As emphasized here, negotiation allows patent holders and technology adopters to form tailored patent license agreements. This helps explain why many
industries favor negotiation over patent pools. About ninety percent of SEPs are licensed through negotiation rather than
through patent pools.355
Patent pools that allow patent holders and technology
adopters the option of negotiating individual licenses generate
royalties that are comparable to market negotiation.356 This suggests that antitrust agencies should continue their policy of

352. TED BUCKLEY, THE MYTH OF THE ANTICOMMONS (2007).
353. See Jonathan M. Barnett, The Anti-Commons Revisited, 29 HARV. J. L.
& TECH. 127, 133 (2015).
354. Id. (“Viewed as a whole, the accumulated body of evidence provides little ground to believe that AC effects typically persist in IP-intensive markets or
cause any significant adverse effect to innovation.”).
355. Tim Pohlmann & Knut Blind, IPlytics Landscaping Study on Standard
Essential Patents (SEPs) in Europe, at 36 (Dec. 12, 2016), https://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/20741/attachments/1/translations/en/renditions/native (“91% of the worldwide declared SEPs are licensed individually rather than through a patent pool.”).
356. See Lerner & Tirole, supra note 31 (discussing a related point in the
context of Cournot and Bertrand pricing); see also Josh Lerner, Marcin Strojwas, & Jean Tirole, The Design of Patent Pools: The Determinants of Licensing
Rules, 38 RAND J. ECON. 610, 610 (2007) (predicting that “pools consisting of
complementary patents are more likely to allow members to engage in independent licensing”).
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neutrality with regards to patent pools and negotiated patent license agreements.
Some policy makers recommend “regulatory patent pools” to
address complementary inventions and technology standards.
For example, the European Commission states that “[t]echnology pools can also produce pro-competitive effects, in particular
by reducing transaction costs and by setting a limit on cumulative royalties to avoid double marginalization.”357 Although patent pools may require complementary inventions, this does not
mean that complementary inventions call for “regulatory patent
pools.”
The antitrust policy recommendation that regulatory authorities should encourage patent pools is based on applications
of the Cournot model. According to the “Cournot Effect,” total
per unit royalties chosen by holders of complementary patents
are greater than those chosen by a bundling monopolist.358 Application of the Cournot model assumes that patent pools choose
running royalties that are constant per unit of output and correspond to those of a bundling monopolist. The “Cournot Effect”
drives the prediction that a patent pool would lower total royalties with complementary inventions.359
Any antitrust policy toward patent pools based on the
“Cournot Effect” is misguided for a number of important reasons.
The main problem with the Cournot model approach is that it
characterizes patent pools as bundling monopolists.360 The
Cournot model approach to patent pools again incorrectly assumes 100% cost pass-through in the downstream market,
which does not describe most markets in practice. The Cournot
model approach to patent pools further assumes that the patent
pool has 100% market power not only in the market for

357. Commission Notice, Guidelines on the Application of Article 81 of the
EC Treaty to Technology Transfer Agreements, 2004 O.J. (C 101) 37,
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2004:101:0002:0042:EN:PDF.
358. See Spulber, supra note 27, at 138 (“[M]onopolists supplying complementary inputs to competitive downstream producers will choose prices whose
total is greater than what a monopolist would charge for a bundle of those inputs.”).
359. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 32, at 123 (“Cournot’s theory of complements cast in terms of blocking patents . . . gives strong support for businesses
to adopt, and for competition authorities to welcome, either cross licensees,
package licenses, or patent pools to clear such blocking positions.”).
360. See Spulber, supra note 27 (discussing the Cournot model).
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inventions but also in the downstream product market. The
Cournot model approach to patent pools further requires that
royalties are constant charges per unit of output, which guaranties price distortions downstream when combined with the monopoly assumptions. Using these assumptions, the Cournot
model predicts that a patent pool would choose a total royalty
such that the downstream output price equals the textbook monopoly price per unit of output. This is the other side of the
“Cournot Effect”, which states that patent holders choose royalties greater than the bundling monopoly.361
The Cournot model approach mischaracterizes the bundling
monopoly patent holder. The bundling monopoly does not face
100% cost pass-through because downstream producers have upward sloping supply curves. As the previous discussion shows,
when the bundling monopoly is a price taker in the downstream
market, the bundling monopoly has an incentive to choose a zero
per unit royalty. The bundling monopoly will choose royalties
that are contingent on downstream market prices. Then, royalties will be a share of the profits of downstream producers.
As noted previously, it is also inaccurate to characterize patent pools as bundling monopolists. In practice, patent pools establish some running royalties that are constant per unit of output.362 These royalties, however, are subject to adjustments that
depart from constant running royalties. The royalties can be a
schedule of running royalties where the royalty rate is lower for
higher numbers of units sold.363 Some of these royalties are
waived for producers with small outputs. Royalties are subject
to firm-level caps that limit total royalties. In addition, the patent pool reduces running royalties over time. For example,
MPEG LA’s running royalty for MPEG-2 Decoders and Encoders
declined steadily: $4.00 per unit before January 1, 2002, $2.00
from January 1, 2010 through December 31, 2015, $0.50 from
January 1, 2016 through December 31, 2017, and $0.35 starting

361. Id. at 138 (“[E]ach input monopolist chooses its price without taking
into account the effect of its price on the demand for all of the complementary
inputs.”).
362. See, e.g., MPEG-2 License Terms Summary, MPEG LA,
https://www.mpegla.com/wp-content/uploads/m2web-RoyaltySummary.pdf
(displaying the royalty schedules of licensing agreements).
363. See, e.g., License Fees, VIA LICENSING, https://www.via-corp.com/licensing/802-11/802-11-license-fees/ (displaying the royalty schedule for the IEE
standard).
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January 1, 2018.364 The level of these running royalties does not
appear consistent with the unlimited monopoly power suggested
by the Cournot model.
The purpose of patent pools is to provide intermediation between patent holders and technology adopters. Patent pools and
other intermediary organizations offer transaction cost savings.365 As I discuss elsewhere, patent pools and other intermediaries provide transaction cost savings by designing “Intellectual Contracts” (ICs) and coordinating contracting.366 Patent
pools and other intermediaries offer market platforms for ICs
that provide the convenience of standardization and one-stop
shopping.367 Merges emphasizes that patent pools offer transaction costs savings of collective rights organizations particularly
with high volume licensing.368 Merges & Mattioli empirically determine transaction cost savings from patent pools.369 Patent
pools also incur transaction costs of formation and costs of determining whether patents are essential to technology standards.370
These observations suggest that antitrust policy should not
promote patent pools as a mechanism for regulating royalties.
The courts have not viewed patent pools as a means of regulating
royalties with complementary inventions. A century of litigation
involving patent pools shows that competitive effects related to
complements have not played an important role.371

364. MPEG-2 License Terms Summary, supra note 362.
365. den Butter et al., supra note 261 at 20.
366. See Spulber, supra note 44.
367. Id.
368. Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1293, 1295–
96 (1996).
369. See Robert P. Merges & Michael Mattioli, Measuring the Costs and Benefits of Patent Pools, 78 OHIO ST. L. J. 281 (2017) (expressing concerns about
welfare effects of patent pools); see also Steven C. Carlson, Patent Pools and the
Antitrust Dilemma, 16 YALE J. REG. 359 (1999) (arguing that the Department
of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission should not adopt a per se rule of
legality for the pooling of blocking patents).
370. Contreras, supra note 21, at 76 (“[P]atent pool licensing comes at a
steep cost. Most importantly, patent pools typically involve substantial up-front
expenses (primarily legal and patent analysis costs) associated with their formation . . . [P]atent pools must ensure, with a high degree of certainty, that all
patents placed in the pool are essential.”).
371. Richard J. Gilbert, Anti-Trust for Patent Pools: A Century of Policy Evolution, 2004 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3, ¶ 13 (“Patents that are one-way or two-way
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The Antitrust Guidelines identify a number of economic
benefits of patent pools and cross-licensing of IP:
These arrangements may provide procompetitive benefits by integrating complementary technologies, reducing transaction costs, clearing
blocking positions, and avoiding costly infringement litigation. By promoting the dissemination of technology, cross-licensing and pooling arrangements are often procompetitive.372

Patent pools thus offer transaction efficiencies and facilitate
technology adoption rather than reducing royalties.
Patent pools generally offer standardized contracts with
take-it-or-leave-it provisions and royalty rates. Consider for example the MPEG LA patent pool, which might best be described
as a patent supermarket consisting of multiple patent pools.
MPEG LA refers to itself as “the world’s leading packager and
provider of one-stop licenses for standards and other technology
platforms.”373 MPEG LA offers patent portfolio licenses related
to the IEEE 1394 high speed transfer digital interface, MPEG-2
video and systems coding standards, MPEG-4 (Part 2) Visual patents, VC-1 digital video coding standard, MVC digital video coding standard, and the digital terrestrial television standard, Dynamic Adaptive Streaming over HTTP (DASH), display ports,
high-efficiency video coding (HEVC), enhanced voice services,
and electric vehicle charging.374 MPEG continues to develop new
patent pools such as the biotechnology CRISPR-Cas9 Joint Licensing Platform.375
MPEG LA connects hundreds of patent holders with more
than 6000 licensees and involves thousands of patents.376 MPEG
LA emphasizes the avoidance of transaction costs and litigation
costs:
By assisting users with implementation of their technology choices,
MPEG LA offers licensing solutions that provide access to fundamental
intellectual property, freedom to operate, reduced litigation risk and
predictability in the business planning process. In turn, this enables
inventors, research institutions and other technology owners to

blocking are complementary, in the sense that an increase in the price of one
patent (or a reduction in its availability) reduces the value of the other patent.”).
372. ANTITRUST GUIDELINES, supra note 4, at 30.
373. MPEG LA, https://www.mpegla.com/.
374. Current Programs, MPEG LA, https://www.mpegla.com/programs/.
375. Programs in Development, MPEG LA, https://www.mpegla.com/programs-in-development/.
376. MPEG LA, supra note 373.
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monetize and speed market adoption of their assets to a worldwide
market while substantially reducing the cost of licensing.377

The MPEG LA patent pool emphasizes that it offers an alternative to negotiation:
To resolve uncertainty and conflict in the use of MPEG-2 intellectual
property, as a convenience to users, the licensing model pioneered and
employed by MPEG LA revolutionized intellectual property rights
management by enabling multiple MPEG-2 users to acquire essential
patent rights from multiple patent holders in a single transaction as
an alternative to negotiating separate licenses.378

Via Licensing, a subsidiary of Dolby Industries, acts as a patent pool.379 The Via patent pool includes various audio patent
licenses: Advanced Audio Coding (AAC), MPEG-4 SLS, and
MPEG Surround.380 The VIA patent pool also includes wireless
patent licenses: Multi-Generational (MG) Wireless Program,
Connected Motor Vehicles, Mobile Devices & General Products,
LTE, WCDMA, and IEEE 802.11.381 SISVEL also operates multiple licensing programs in wireless communications, digital
video and display technology, audio and video coding and decoding, broadband, and localization.382
V. CONCLUSION
Negotiation of patent license agreements in competitive
markets provides coordination and economic efficiency. Negotiation avoids multiple marginalizations and allows royalties to be
contingent on market outcomes. Negotiation helps realize benefits from increases in the number of patents that improve invention and innovation. This counters the view that there are “too
many patents.” Negotiation also helps industries obtain the benefits of standardization, which increases the returns to adopting
technologies and the value of the best alternative technologies.
Public policy makers should continue to carefully consider
the institutional features of the market for IP licensing. Proposed policies that discourage negotiation of patent license contracts in competitive markets appear designed to decrease patent license royalties and reduce the returns to invention.
377. Id.
378. About, MPEG LA, https://www.mpegla.com/about/.
379. About, VIA LICENSING, https://www.via-corp.com/about/.
380. Innovation, VIA LICENSING, https://www.via-corp.com/innovation/.
381. Id.
382. Licensing Programs, SISVEL, https://www.sisvel.com/licensing-programs/background.
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Antitrust policies that promote the interests of technology
adopters over patent holders would be consistent with rent-seeking.383 If total royalties are too low, revenues from SEPs will discourage inventors’ investment in R&D and diminish the quality
of the new technology. This will reduce the rate of technological
change and decrease dynamic efficiency. Some have observed diminished incentives to invent, including “lower research intensity,” the “creativity crisis,” the “end of low-hanging fruit,” and
the “techcrunch.”384
The negotiation framework presented here reverses predictions based on the Cournot model. Antitrust policies based on
the “Cournot Effect” would weaken protections for IP and diminish incentives for invention, innovation, and standardization.
There is little empirical or conceptual support for antitrust policies driven by the “Cournot Effect”: “royalty stacking,” “SEP
holdup,” “patent thickets,” “blocking patents,” and the “Tragedy
of the Anticommons.” Antitrust policy should not encourage
“regulatory patent pools” as a means of reducing royalties. Antitrust policy should view patent pools as a means of mitigating
transaction costs under some market conditions.
The Antitrust Guidelines recognize that patent license negotiation with complementary inventions enhances competition.
The Antitrust Guidelines reflect the economic performance of
markets for patent license agreements. Most patent licensing
outside of patent pools involves negotiation. Patent licensing
contracts outside of patent pools typically involve contingencies
that reflect prices, revenues, or profit. The market power of inventors in markets for IP and in product markets is significantly
constrained by competition from substitute technologies,
383. For information on rent-seeking, see Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs
of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. ECON. J. 224 (1967); Anne O. Krueger,
The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 291
(1974); Robert D. Tollison, Rent Seeking: A Survey, 35 KYKLOS 575 (1982); GORDON TULLOCK, RENT SEEKING (1993).
384. See Richard Florida, America’s Looming Creativity Crisis, HARV. BUS.
REV., Oct. 2004, https://hbr.org/2004/10/americas-looming-creativity-crisis; TYLER COWEN, THE GREAT STAGNATION: HOW AMERICA ATE ALL THE LOW-HANGING FRUIT OF MODERN HISTORY, GOT SICK, AND WILL (EVENTUALLY) FEEL BETTER (2011); Mark R. Anderson, The Big Shift: The End Of The Era Of Great
Invention, FORBES (Aug. 11, 2013, 10:30 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ciocentral/2013/08/11/the-big-shift/ - 362d627788c9; John G. Fernald & Charles I.
Jones, The Future of US Economic Growth, 104 AM. ECON. REV. 44 (2014); Erik
Brynjolfsson, Andrew McAfee & Michael Spence, Labor, Capital, and Ideas in
the Power Law Economy, 93 FOREIGN AFF. 44 (2014).
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complementary component suppliers, output producers, distributors, and retailers. Royalties in practice are a small fraction of
revenues in such industries as mobile telecommunications,
where technology standards and SEPs play important roles. A
better understanding of patent license negotiation helps address
antitrust concerns regarding innovation and standardization.

162

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

***

[Vol. 22:1

